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LAW REVIEW Number 2
REAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE
LAW: PART I
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
R ights, whatever this word may mean in the framework of a
concrete legal system,' may be classified according to a
variety of criteria. Philosophically inclined jurists in various
parts of the world have established in their efforts at sys-
tematization of the law classifications of rights varying from:
the abstractions of a purely analytical jurisprudence to the crea-
tion of working concepts tested by the functional method. 2
Modern American scholars postulate a classification of "in-
terests" (rather than "rights") into the broad categories of
interests in personality, interests in property, and interests in
relations. 3 This tripartite division could, perhaps, be adopted
for the purpose of a meaningful analysis of civilian institutions. 4
Civilian commentators, however, have not as yet fully explored
this lucid approach. Analysis of civilian institutions is ordi-
narily based, in accordance with a perennial tradition, on the
analytically questionable dichotomy of rights into "patrimonial"
and "extra-patrimonial." 5 Patrimonial rights are those sus-
*Research Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 4 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 56 (1959) : "There is no more ambiguous word in
legal and juristic literature than the word right."
2. See 2 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 760 (1885) ; KOCOUREK, JURAL RELATIONS
29-49 (1927); PATON, A TEXT-BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 231-40 (1951); 4
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 41-90 (1959) ; STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF
LAW 68-69, 124-30 (1950) ; 1 WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS 87
(1891). Cf. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS G1tN1tRALES DU DROIT PRIVt DEPUIS
LE CODE NAPOLItON 13 (1912) (suggesting avoidance of the obnoxious term
"right").
3. See Green, Basic Concepts: Persons, Property, Relations, 24 A.B.A.J. 65
(1938) ; id., Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 1041 (1934) ; 30 ILL. L.
REV. 1, 314 (1935) ; 31 ILL. L. REV. 35 (1936) ; GREEN, MALONE, PEDRICK, &
RASIL, CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS, Foreword (1959). Cf. 3 POUND, JUIUS-
PRUDENCE 25-30 (1959).
4. Analysis of legal institutions in terms of protected interests rather than
rights was first suggested by Jhering. See JHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECIT 467-
83 (1877) ; id., 3 GEIST DES ROMISCIIEN RECHTS 317-54 (1871).
5. Cf. 1 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 133-36, 235-36 (1955); 1 ENNECCERUS-
[161]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ceptible of pecuniary evaluation, and which, for this reason, may
form part of a person's "patrimony."6 All other rights are extra-
patrimonial. In this last category are frequently included "right
of personality" and "family rights."
According to a rigorous traditional classification, patrimonial
rights are either "personal" or "real."' 7 This dichotomy can be
fully grasped only in the light of the civilian tradition which
distinguishes sharply between the law of property and the law
of obligations. The real right appears as a right which a person
has in a thing, a matter of property law. The personal right
is a right which a person has against another person to demand
a performance, a matter of the law of obligations. In this light,
despite certain similarities, the two kinds of rights appear to
be of different natures. A usufructuary and a lessee, according
to appearances, seem to have the use and enjoyment of a house
in much the same way. But, technically, the usufructuary has
a right in the enjoyment of the house; the lessee has a right
against the owner of the house to let him enjoy the house. One
has a real right and the other a personal ight.
The notion of real rights as a systematic generalization is
firmly established in all western systems of law, though its
content and precise meaning may differ among particular sys-
tems." In this study, real rights will be discussed with reference
to the civilian tradition, with attention focused on Louisiana
law. For purposes of comparison, brief reference will be made
to the findings of analytical jurisprudence, designed to explain
the function of real rights within the framework of Anglo-
American law. Analysis of Louisiana law will be preceded, for
historical reasons, by a brief analysis of Roman law and French
law.
NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGERLICHEN RECHTS 291-302 (1952) ; LEH-
MANN, ALLGEMEINEu TEIL DES B.G.B. 80 (1957).
6. On the notion of "patrimony," see 1 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 137 (1950)
2 id. 1-9 (1957) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAiTA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVgAIS
19-30 (1952).
7. See BAuDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITP TH1tORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL,
5 SUPPLEMENT by Bonnecase 1-2 (1930) ; 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 31 (1957)
9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITtA DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 337 (1874-82) ; 1 ENBEN-
ZWEIG, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES OSTERREICHISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 125-30 (1951);
1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BVRGERLICHEN RECHTS 291
(1952); 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 41
(1952) (with bibliography) ; 1 WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS
95 (1891).
8. See GINOSSAR, DROIT RflEL, PROPRI1PTt ET CRPANCE 1-2 (1960); Gieseke,
Belastung, in 2 RECHTSVERGLEICHENDES HANDW6RTERBUCH 426 (1929).
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I. ROMAN LAW
The term "real rights" (jura in re) is an abstraction un-
known to classical Roman law.9 The classical jurists were pre-
occupied with the availability of remedies rather than the exist-
ence of substantive rights, and did not have a generic term to
include all "rights" which civilian scholars of following genera-
tions classified as "real." The expression ("real rights") was
first coined by medieval writers elaborating on the Digest in an
effort to explain ancient procedural forms of action in terms
of substantive rights.
Actions in Roman law were classified as either personal
(actiones in personam) or real (actiones in rem).1o The termi-
nology reflected certain peculiarities of the Roman forms of
action. In personal actions, the intentio, namely that part of the
writ (formula) in which the cause of action was stated, indicated
the name of the defendant; in real actions there was reference
to the name of only the plaintiff in the intentio, and the name
of the defendant first appeared in another part of the writ, the
condemnatio. The distinction, though originally regarded as one
of form and procedure, carried significant substantive implica-
tions: an actio in personam involved a demand against a certain
person for the performance of an obligatio; an actio in rem
involved a demand for the restitution of a res. Actions for en-
forcement of obligations were always personal. Obligations were
conceived as a bond between a certain plaintiff and a certain
defendant, and there could be no cause of action unless the name
of the defendant appeared in the intentio. In contrast to obliga-
tions, actions for the enforcement of ownership rights, real
security, and family or inheritance rights were founded not on
a duty owed by a certain defendant to a certain plaintiff but on
a claim that the holder of the right had against anyone. Ac-
cordingly, identification of the defendant was essential only for
the purpose of sentencing him to restore these violated rights.
These peculiarities connected with the enforcement of claims
in Roman law were rationalized by medieval scholars as in-
9. See SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 335 (1951) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPFRT,
TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 41, n. 2 (1952). Cf. Villey, Le jus in
re du droit romain classique au droit moderne, in 2 PUBLICATIONS DE L'INSTITUT
DE DROIT ROMAIN DE L'UNIVERSITA DE PARIS 207 (1947).
10, See JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 4.6.1: "Omnium actionum . . summa divisio
in duo genera deducitur: aut enim in rem sunt aut in personam" ; SOHM-MITTEIS-
WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES RMISCHEN RECHTS 686 (1923); 9 DEMOLOMBE,
TRAITAb DE LA DISTINCTION DES nIENS 343 (1874-82) ; LAWSON, A COMMON LAW-
YER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 102 (1953).
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volving a distinction between absolute rights (i.e., rights avail-
able against everyone) and relative rights (i.e., rights available
only against a particular defendant). Among the absolute 'rights
were included, quite naturally, ownership and its dismember-
ments, like usufruct and servitude: these were res, protected by
an actio in rem. These proprietary interests were in turn given
the collective denomination "real rights" (jura in re) in con-
trast to merely "personal rights," namely obligations, which
were enforceable by an actio in personam. Further elaboration
on the Roman texts seemed to warrant the validity of this
analytical dichotomy by reference to another distinguishing
feature: "real rights" conferred a direct power or authority
over a thing while merely "personal rights," even when relating
to things, conferred power over another person who, in, turn,
was "obligated" to make a performance.1 ' The real rights in
Roman law were limited in number. They were ownership, use,
habitation, usufruct, servitudes, pledge, real mortgage, super-
ficies, and emphyteusis. Ownership was a real right in one's
own thing, a jus in re propria. All other real rights were inter-
ests in things belonging to somebody else, jura in re aliena.
This is in substance the doctrine of real rights as developed
in middle ages on the basis of the Roman texts. The doctrine
was compatible with the feudal structure of medieval economy,
and was further developed to accommodate feudal tenures which
came to be regarded as new species of real rights attaching to
land.1 2 In that regard, departure from Roman law standards
occurred not only through the increase of the number of real
rights but also through the development of "personal" servi-
tudes, involving affirmative duties due by tenant to a landlord.
II. FRENCH LAW
The French Civil Code does not draw a formal distinction
between "personal" and "real" patrimonial rights. Doctrine and
jurisprudence, however, have established this analytical distinc-
tion in France by reference to a number of articles in the Code
Civil. The establishment of the distinction necessitated further
analysis of the definitions of real and personal rights, analysis
of their respective natures, and their contrast with one another.
11. See SOIIM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES RMISCHEN RECIHTS 264
(1923); WEISS, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCITEN PRIVATREClITS. 13 (1949).;
LEACIh, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW .134 (1948); 1 HUVEL1N, COURS fLtMENTAIRE DR
DROIT ROMAIN 416 (1927). . . . . ..
12. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT' DE LA DISTINCTIONDES BIENS 406 (1874-82).
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A. Personal Rights
"Personal rights" are neither enumerated nor defined in the
Code Civil. Doctrine and jurisprudence, relying mostly on Ar-
ticles 1101, 1126, and 2092 of the Code Civil,'3 arrived at the
broadly accepted definition that a personal right is the power
which a person (creditor) has to demand from another person
(debtor) a performance. 14 This performance may consist in
giving, doing, or not doing, a thing. Conversely, a personal
duty (obligation) is the legal bond by which the debtor is con-
strained - under the control and guarantee of the State - to
furnish a performance to the creditor.
The personal right appears as a subjection of one person to
another. Actually, it is only the patrimony of the debtor that
is subjected to the authority of the creditor. Whether the per-
formance relates to something patrimonial or to an act of a
personal character, the ultimate responsibility of the debtor
is a financial one: a sum of money paid as damages in case of
non-performance (Article 1142). This is expressed in the adage
"who obliges obliges his own" - namely, patrimony. It is also
said that the creditor has a general pledge on the property of
his debtor (Article 2093). This is not a pledge in the technical
sense which would constitute a veritable real right (cf. Article
2073). It is merely a right of seizure that the creditor has:
the patrimony of the debtor, as it exists at the time payment
is due, may be subjected to seizure for the satisfaction of the
creditor. Thus, in the last analysis, the personal right may be
regarded as a right to a fraction of the debtor's patrimony.
All obligations may thus be reduced to the same pecuniary
denominator, whether they are money obligations from their
inception or are later converted into a claim for damages as a
result of nonperformance. This "homogeneity"' 15 of all obliga-
tions carries practical consequences which become apparent in
concursus proceedings. Where the value of the property seized
is insufficient to satisfy all creditors, satisfaction will be pro-
13. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1761, 1126, 2092 (1870).
14. See 4 AUBBY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 6 (1935) ; BAUDEY-
LACANTINERIE, TRAITt TIAORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, 5 SUPPLEMENT
by Bonnecase 12 (1930) ; 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 33 (1957) ; 1 DEmoGUE, 4
TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS EN GAN]tRAL 3 (1923) ; 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA
DISTINCTION DES BIENS 339 (1874-82) ; 2 JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL P01-
TIF FRANQAIS 1 (1933). Cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPEST, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL. FEANQAIS 47 (1952).
15. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT civ. 34 (1957).
1963]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
portionate to approved claims. This postulates that as between
all holders of personal rights money is the common measure of
satisfaction (Article 2093).
B. Real Right8
The French revolution wiped out the feudal tenures and
threatened with extinction the very notion of "real rights." The
redactors of the French Civil Code, however, struck a happy
balance between the demand for a free and unencumbered owner-
ship and the need for recognition of several proprietary inter-
ests less than full ownership, whether created by party agree-
ment or by operation of law. Thus, the system of the French
Civil Code precludes the resurrection of feudal tenures and at
the same time permits the creation of property rights in things
owned by someone else. The term "real rights" has been avoided
meticulously except in connection with real mortgage16 but a
number of interests are recognized which bear traditional names
and function as the ancient real rights did.
There has been no generally accepted definition of the term
"real rights" in French law. In that respect, it has been said
that there are as many definitions as there are commentators. 17
This is understandable because definition of this term is in-
volved, necessarily, with the highly controversial nature 8 of real
rights. According to a broadly accepted definition, a real right
is the judicially recognized authority which enables a person to
draw from a thing directly all or part of its economic advan-
tages.'9 The thing appears subjected to the authority of a per-
son - one speaks of a right in the thing - and figures as an
essential feature in the legal relationship. This, however, is a
metaphor because, by definition, things cannot "participate" in
a legal relationship.20
The traditional and generally accepted enumeration of real
rights includes ownership, use, habitation, usufruct, servitudes,
16. See CODE CIVIL art. 2114, § 1: "L'hypothque est un droit rel . f.
LA. CivmL CODE art. 3282 (1870) : "The mortgage is a real right ....
17. See 1 ORTOLAN, EXPLICATION HISTORIQUE DES INSTITUS DE LEMPEREUR
JUSTINIEN 72 (1951).
18. See text at notes 43-48 infra.
19. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITt THIAORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL, 5 SUPPLEMENT by Bonnecase 11 (1930) ; 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 32
(1957) ; 1 DEMoGUE, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GANItRAL 5 (1923) ; GINoSSA,
DROIT BtEL, PROPRIATt ET CrtANCE 3 (1960); 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITk
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 41 (1952).
20. See 2 CARBONNIEE, DROIT CIVIL 32 (1957) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPEST, TBAIfT
PUATIQUE DR DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 42 (1952).
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mortgage, and pledge. All these rights are established and regu-
lated by the Code Civil.21 Then, privileges, superficies, mineral
rights, and emphyteusis are added as having their foundation
in the Code, 22 special legislation,23 or court action. 24 Certain
authors are inclined to add the lessee's right under a predial
lease to this list since this right may be asserted against third
parties. 25 But the Court of Cassation has repeatedly held that
predial leases are personal contracts 26 despite code provisions
and statuLory legislation which have strengthened the position
of the lessee vis-a-vis the landowner and third parties .2  Apart
from the real rights created and regulated by the civil law, there
are known in France "real rights" established and governed by
administrative law.28  These rights are granted by the public
authorities to private persons for exclusive use and enjoyment
of things belonging to the public domain. Unlike the real rights
of the civil law, these "administrative" real rights are temporary
and revocable; but in all other respects they function as veritable
real rights, for they confer a right in the thing which can be
21. See CODE CIVIL arts. 544-577 (ownership) ; 578-636 (usufruct, use and
habitation) ; 637-710 (servitudes) ; 2071-2091 (pledge) ; 2114-2203 (mortgage).
Of. 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 32 (1957) ; 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITP DE LA DISTINC-
TION DES BIENS 337 (1874-82).
22. Privileges: see CODE CIVIL arts. 2092-2113. The question of the juridical
nature of privileges has been discussed in France extensively. See BAUDRY-LACAN-
TINERIE, TRAITIt TH1PORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, 5 SUPPLIPMENT by Bonne-
case 437-510 (1930) ; text at notes 279-287 infra. With respect to superficies, see
9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITII DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 368 (1874-82). CI. CODE
CIVIL arts. 553, 664, 519; text at notes 73-89 infra. With respect to emphyteusis
see Cass. Dec. 15, 1824, D. 1824. 1.96. CI. DEMOLOMBE, Op. cit. supra at 379;
text at notes 90-104 inIra.
23. See Law of April 21, 1810 (mineral rights). Cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 523 (1952). See also Law of June 25,
1902 (emphyteusis). Cf. PLANIOL, Op. cit. $upra at 985.
24. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 392 (1874-82)
asserting that emphyteusis, having been abolished by the Civil Code, was resur-
rected by the courts. Cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITk PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANQAIS 986 (1952).
25. See 6 MERLIN, RECUEIL ALPHABETIQUE DES QUESTIONS DE DROIT, Tiers
§ II, 389 (1820) ; 1 TROPLONO, DE L' ACHANGE ET DU LOUAGE 60 (1859) ; DER-
RUPPt, LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DU DROIT DU PRENEUR I BAIL ET LA DISTINCTION
DES DROITS RtELS ET DES DROITS DE CRtANCE (Diss., Toulouse 1952) ; Savatier,
Essai d'une prds6entation nouvelle des biens incorporels, 56 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DE DROIT CIVIL 331, 339 (1958). Cf. DAINOW, LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DU DROIT DU
PRENEUR k BAIL DANS LA LOI FRANVAISE ET DANS LA LOI DU QUIkBEC 24-26 (Diss.,
Dijon, 1931) ; GINOSSAR, DROIT R9EL, PROPRIlT]t ET CRIIANCE 168-79 (1960).
26. See Cass., March 6, 1861, D.61.1.417, S.61.1.713; Feb. 21, 1865, D.65.1.132,
8.65.1.113 and recent jurisprudence collected in 10 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TBAITt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 760, notes 1-7 (1956).
27. See CODE CIVIL arts. 1709, 1743; Law of Sept. 1, 1948 (rent legislation)
Decree of Sept. 30, 1953 (commercial property) ; RURAL CODE art. 790 (1955)
(agricultural exploitation).
28. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TEAiTt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FSANQAIS 55
(1952).
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asserted against all but the granting public authorities. In this
category belong the rights of riparian landowners in public
roads, concessions in cemeteries, canals, and railroads, and the
rights that ministers of faith and members of a congregation
have in their religious establishments.
For systematic purposes, real rights are distinguished as
principal or accessory.29 The principal real rights pertain to the
substance of the thing which is placed to the service of the
holder of the right. The accessory real rights (i.e., accessory of
obligations of which they guarantee payment) pertain to. the
pecuniary value of a thing. This value has been reserved to
satisfy the interests of the holder of the right. Principal real
rights are the right of ownership and its permissible dismember-
ments: use, habitation, usufruct, predial servitudes, and emphy-
teusis. Accessory real rights are the rights of real mortgage,
pledge, privileges on immovables, and special privileges on mov-
ables (whose nature is controversial) .8
The question whether individuals may create new real rights
or work modifications on the real rights established in the Code
Civil has been a highly controversial issue in France. Article 543
of the Code Civil provides that "one may have in things either a
right of ownership or a simple right of enjoyment or only the
right to claim predial servitudes thereon." In the Exposg des
Motifs, accompanying the promulgation of the Code, it is stated
that:
"These are actually the only modifications of which own-
ership is susceptible in our political and social organization;
there cannot be in things any other species of rights: one has
either a complete and perfect ownership which includes the
right to enjoy and to dispose of; or one has a simple right
of enjoyment without being able to dispose of the land; or,
finally, one has only the right to claim predial servitudes on
the property of another; servitudes which cannot be estab-
lished but for the use and utility of an estate; servitudes
which do not entail any affirmative duties of the person;
servitudes, finally, which have nothing in common with
feudal tenures, destroyed forever. ' ' 31
29. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 32 (1957) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 46 (1952).
30. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITt T1ItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL, 5 SUPPLEMENT -by Bonnecase 463-510 (1930).
31. See ExPost DES MOTIFS by Mr. Treilhard, 11 FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET
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In the absence of a legislative text directly in point, however,
the prevailing view in France is that contractual freedom ought
to be respected provided that the limits of public policy are not
transcended.32 Thus, neither feudal tenures may be resurrected
nor interests created contrary to Articles 530 and 686 of the
Code Civil. Within these broad limits individuals may create
new real rights by dismembering their ownership as they see fit,
and work modifications on existing real rights. This view is
supported by the maxim that what is not forbidden is permitted,
and by the code provisions declaring that individuals have the
freedom to dispose of their property by onerous or gratuitous
title, in whole or in part, according to combinations that they
consider convenient to adopt, provided that these combinations
are not contrary to public policy (Articles 437, 544, 1134). A'
stumbling block, the enumeration of real rights in Article 543,
was set aside: this enumeration is incomplete and, quite natu-
rally, this article was interpreted as illustrative rather than
exclusive. As early as 1834, the Court of Cassation declared
that "Articles 544, 546, and 552 of the Code Napoleon are decla-
ratory of the general law concerning the nature and effects of
ownership, and not prohibitive; neither these articles nor any
other law may exclude the various modifications and dismember-
ments of which the ordinary right of ownership is susceptible. 3 3
The prevailing view is further supported by realistic considera-
tions of general utility and convenience: different advantages
which ownership of a thing confers may be enjoyed by different
people, to the best interests of society. But it has been observed
that split ownership may be the source of frequent litigation
and may hinder effective exploitation of wealth.8 4
A minority view, tending to restrict party autonomy, rests
primarily on the proposition that the parties to a contract can-
not derogate from laws of public policy (Articles 6, 1133, 1172)
and that the rules concerning security of acquisition and transfer
of ownership are rules of this nature.3 5 For the same reasons
that parties may not by agreement subject to a real mortgage
things other than those enumerated in Article 2115 of the Code
Civil, they cannot modify existing real rights or create new ones.
DES TRAVAUX PRAPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 33 (1836).
32. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRATA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 54
(1952) ; Cf. 2 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 27 (1833).
33. Cass., Feb. 13, 1834, D.1834.1.205, S.1834.1.206. See also Amiens, Dec. 2,
1835, S.1835.2.198.
34. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITl DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 431 (1874-82).
35. See id. at 431-32.
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According to this view, the real rights which individuals may
establish must necessarily be some of the rights enumerated in,
Articles 543 and 2114 of the Code, namely, ownership, use and
habitation, usufruct, predial servitudes, and mortgages.36 It is
only within these limits that party autonomy may move freely.
If a right does not fall within these well-established categories,
it is a personal right under the Code. And it has been suggested
that most of the modifications of ownership recognized as valid
by the French courts actually fall within these accepted cate-
gories.37
French courts have recognized as permissible dismember-
ments of ownership the right to hunt,8  the right to own trees
on another's land,39 and the right of ingress and egress in order
to cut timber. 40 Land ownership may thus be divided vertically
and horizontally. Ownership may also be fractioned in such a
way that one person may have the enjoyment of the land while
overflowed by water, and another person when the land is dried
up, provided that this occurs in regular intervals. 4' But while
party autonomy has been recognized in principle, little use of
this facility has been made in practice. The reason for this
paucity is that any new real right should necessarily be a dis-
memberment of ownership and the law itself provides for and
regulates most socially useful dismemberments. Inventiveness
and imagination necessarily function within a field pre-empted
by law and prescribed by rules of public policy. Moreover, new
real rights created by the exercise of party autonomy must con-
form to certain formalities and be recorded in order to be as-
serted against third parties. But recordation is ordinarily avail-
able only for transactions and rights described specifically in
applicable statutes.42
C. Real Rights and Personal Rights Contrasted
A number of differences between the established categories
of personal and real rights are noticeable in most cases. How-
ever, the existence of intermediary categories of rights which
36. See 1 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIhRE, TRAITAI DE DROIT
CIVIL 958 (1953) ; GINossAB, DROIT RtEL, PROPRIPTt ET CR]AANCE 147 (1960).
37. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 437 (1874-82).
38. See Amiens, Dec. 2, 1835, S.1935.2.198.
39. Cass. Dec. 26, 1833, Gaz. Pal. 1833. 1108; Feb. 20, 1851, D.1851.1.54.
40. Caen, Feb. 17, 1837, 1 REC. DE CAEN 187, 38 REP. DALLOZ 202 (1857).
41. Cass. Jan. 31, 1838, Dev. 1838.1.120.
42. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 55
(1952).
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tend to' blur distinctions is also noticeable. Any contrast, there-
fore, must be viewed primarily as a device for systematic
analysis. The differences between personal and real rights,
when noticeable, relate to the nature, structure, and function
of the respective rights.
There has been much discussion in France concerning the
respective nature of real and personal rights. Diametrically
opposite views have been advanced, tempers have flared, and
the discussion still goes on.
According to the traditional definition, real rights are said
to involve subjection of a thing, in whole or in part, to the
authority of a person by virtue of a direct relationship which
can be asserted against the world.48 This definition postulates
a direct legal- relationship between the holder of the right as
subject and the thing as object. By contrast, personal rights
involve relations between persons, the creditor being an active
subject and the debtor a passive subject.
The traditional analysis of the respective nature of real and
personal rights has been subjected to severe criticism by a num-
ber of modern writers. These writers ("personalists") have
pointed out that, by definition, rights involve relations between
persons and that the postulation of a direct legal relationship
between a person and a thing is "nonsense. ' ' 44 The only possible
direct relation between a person and a thing is factual rather
than legal. This is possession, i.e., the physical control that a
person may exercise over a thing.
According to the personalist writers a real right constitutes
a universal passive obligation and is defined as "a legal relation-
ship established between one person as active subject and all
other persons as passive subjects. ' 45 This legal relationship is
of the same nature as all obligations. It imposes a (passive)
duty to refrain from interferences with the peaceful possession
of the holder of the real right. The creditor of the obligation
is the holder of the real right and the debtors are an unlimited
number of persons. Because of the passive role attributed to
the debtors, attention is ordinarily focused on the creditor-holder
43. Of. note 18 supra; MICHAS, LE DROIT RtEL CONSIDERt COMME UNE OBLIGA-
TION PASSIVEMENT UNIVERSELLE 68 (1900).
44. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 42
(.1952).
45. Id. at 43.
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of the real right - and the idea of a direct relationship between
a person and a thing emerges. But though one may tend! to lose
sight of the passive debtors, they still exist in the background,
and the obligation imposed against the entire world becomes
visible in case of interference with the possession of the holder
of the right. The one interfering is liable to pay damages which
would be inconceivable in the absence of a previous obligation
to refrain from interference. Thus, certain of these writers,
following their analysis to its logical conclusion, fail to see any
difference between real and personal rights: patrimonial rights
may be distinguished only by reference to their stronger or
weaker variable content. 46 Most personalist writers, however,
concede the validity of the distinction between personal and real
rights for systematic and practical purposes, despite lack of dif-
ference as to the respective nature of these rights.
According to the personalist doctrine, both real and personal
rights derive from "obligations," and their constitutive elements
are the same. They differ only with regard to the number of
the passive subjects involved and the scope of the duties as-
sumed. Personal rights always involve a limited and determined
number of obligors; real rights involve an unlimited and un-
determined number of obligors. Personal rights are thus rela-
tive; real rights are absolute. As to the scope of the obligations
assumed, it is observed that real rights conceived as universal
passive obligations are static and may impose only negative
duties. Conversely, personal rights are dynamic and may im-
pose both negative and affirmative duties.
Critics of the personalist approach indicate that the assump-
tion of a universal obligation is a fiction.4 7 Persons who never
come into contact with the holder of a real right cannot be
regarded as bound by an "obligation." The passive subjects of
the universal obligation are indefinite and undetermined; they
become determined only when they interfere with the free exer-
cise of a real right by its holder. Thus, in the absence of any
interference, it is not logical to define the nature of a right by
reference to unknown and undetermined "obligors." There is,
perhaps, a universal obligation to respect a real right but similar
obligations exist in connection with all so-called "absolute"
rights. This doctrine, therefore, fails to offer distinguishing
46. See DEMOGUE, NOTIONS FONDAMENTALES DU DROIT PRIVik 440 (1911).
47. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITA THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROlT
civiL, 5 SUPPLEMENT by Bonnecase 50 (1930).
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features explaining the prerogatives of the holder of a real right
and the content of his authority.
An effort at reconciliation of the conflicting doctrines has
been made in France on the assumption that real rights involve
two aspects. Externally, real rights appear as obligations im-
posed on all persons to respect the position of the holder of these
rights - passive obligations which become active when a cer-
tain person is under a duty to restore possession of a thing to
the holder of the right. Internally, real rights appear as power
over a thing which the holder of a real right has. This power
is protected by law and is not merely a factual relationship.
Further, all attributes of this power are controlled and regulated
by law, and this feature distinguishes real rights from obliga-
tions. Still further, the holder of a real right is able to create
new legal relations concerning the thing which can be asserted
against third parties. Accordingly, real rights are defined as
those rights which impose a general obligation to respect the
power which the law confers on a certain person to derive from
things the whole or only part of the advantages which their
possession entails or as those rights which confer on a person
a direct and immediate authority over a thing which is operative
not only against a certain person but against the world.
48
Structural differences between personal and real rights are
manifested in a number of practical consequences.
In the first place, the holder of a real right may abandon it
by his unilateral act. Abandonment enables the holder of a real
right to avoid obligations and charges attached to a thing (Ar-
ticles 656, 699, 2172). On the contrary, the creditor of an
obligation cannot renounce his right to a certain performance
unilaterally. The remission of a debt is a contract and the con-
sent of the debtor indispensable.
Secondly, the personal right is effective only between the
parties and, in principle, cannot be asserted against third par-
ties (Article 1165). Third parties may disregard personal rights
and only in exceptional cases may they be held for having inten-
tionally interfered with a contractual relationship. The real
right, as a right in the thing, may be asserted against the world
and every one must respect it and refrain from unauthorized
48. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP PRATIQUE DR DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 46
(1952). But ef. GINOSSAR, DROIT EEL, PROPRIPTP, ET CRRIANCE 182 (1960), de-
fining real rights as those generating real obligations.
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interferences. These differences tend to disappear in certain
instances. Thus, not only negative duties but also affirmative
ones may be due to holders of real rights by virtue of police
regulations or provisions of the Code Civil (Articles 646 and
663). Further, according to a modern trend, an increasing
number of personal rights may be asserted against third parties.
Social and economic interests have generated a movement tend-
ing to secure to third parties benefits deriving from contractual
relations existing among other parties. This trend is also ap-
parent in the field of delictual responsibility. Finally, the "obli-
gation" to respect the life, honor, and health of another, correla-
tive to the so-called "right of personality," is similar to one
deriving from a real right. It is a universal passive obligation
to abstain from unauthorized interferences.
Thirdly, real rights are so closely interwoven with their
object that they cannot exist apart from it. Ownership, usufruct,
and servitudes are inconceivable without an object which must
be an existing and individually determined thing. To the con-
trary, the object of obligations need be determinable only by
quantity and quality, i.e., as genus rather than species, and may
be a future thing. Strictly speaking, therefore, one cannot own
a future thing but can only be the creditor of a person who will
procure or manufacture a thing in the future.49
And fourthly, in a strict sense, only real rights are sus-
ceptible of possession. Obligations and personal status are sus-
ceptible of possession in a metaphorical sense. This possession
is merely an appearance of a person in the eyes of other persons
as holder of a right or as entitled to a certain status. The con-
stituent elements and the juridical consequences of this posses-
sion are different from those deriving from the possession of
which real rights are susceptible, which is one of their principal
attributes.0
In contrast to personal rights, real rights include two im-
portant attributes, the right to follow and the right of prefer-
ence.
It is a prerogative of the holder of a real right to exercise
his right over the thing in whatever hands it may be found. The
49. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 35 (1957). But cf. DEmoG E, NoTIoNs
FONDAMENTALES DU DROIT PRIVIt 441 (1911).
50. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 53
(1952).
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owner of a thing may thus reclaim it in the hands of any pos-
sessor. This is always so with regard to immovables; while
with regard to movables the right to follow is frequently
paralyzed by Article 2279, which declares that possession of a
movable is equivalent to title. The holder of the right of a
predial servitude may exercise it against any owner of the
servient estate. But it is with regard to real security that the
right to follow acquires its full practical significance and results
in a tangible difference between hypothecary and ordinary credi-
tors. The mortgagee can seize the immovable in the hands of a
third purchaser and in doing so merely exercises the right to
follow which is inherent in his real right. General creditors,
except in case of fraud, have no standing against the purchaser
of an immovable (Article 1167). In this case, the immovable
no longer forms part of the debtor's patrimony and, as ordinary
creditors have no right to follow, it cannot be seized. It has
been suggested that this distinction is not generally valid because
there are obligations which confer the right to follow. As ex-
amples are mentioned the contract of lease and the right of a
creditor to claim restitution from one receiving payment under
circumstances discharging his debtor of all responsibilities (Ar-
ticle 1240). But the prevailing view is that these examples
are not well taken. 51 The right of the lessee against the owner
of the thing leased is a specific right accorded to him by special
provision in the Code and the right of the creditor in the second
example is an application of the principle of unjust enrichment.
Obligations do not confer the right to follow, though it is cer-
tainly within the power of the legislature to extend to certain
personal rights, without changing their nature, the type of pro-
tection ordinarily granted to real rights.
The right of preference is the prerogative which the holder
of a real right has to exclude from the enjoyment of a thing
all persons having only a personal right or a real right of an
inferior rank. The purchaser of a thing may claim delivery in
case the vendor becomes insolvent and is thus accorded preferen-
tial treatment in comparison with ordinary creditors of the
bankrupt. This is so because the purchaser acquires the real
right of ownership by virtue of the contract of sale. But it is
again in the field of real security that the right of preference,
as the right to follow, produces its most important practical
51. Id. at 51.
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consequences. The mortgagee having a real right will be paid
before other creditors having only personal rights, and, among
several mortgagees, the older will be preferred over the more
recent ones (prior tempore, potior lure). It has been observed,
however, that the right of preference may exist for the benefit
of an obligation and that in effect Article 2093 of the Code sanc-
tions the rule "first in time, preferable in law."5 2
D. Intermediary Categories
The distinction between personal and real rights has been
said to be "fundamental" in French law.58 The character and
content of the passive obligations which real rights generate,
and the power of the holder of a real right to derive economic
advantages from the thing directly, suffice to establish this dis-
tinction. But differences apart, real rights and personal rights
are not such "pure" concepts as to exclude the existence of
several categories of rights which partake of the nature of both
and therefore defy accurate classification. These rights struc-
turally appear to be personal rights, but functionally exhibit
characteristics common to real rights.
Of this nature are, in the first place, the so-called "real
obligations" (obligations r~elles, obligationes propter rem). 6
As example is given the obligation imposed by Articles 698 and
699 of the Code Civil on the owner of a servient estate to con-
struct at his expense all the necessary works for the exercise of
the servitude. This is an "obligation," as it involves a perform-
ance due to a creditor. But this obligation instead of attaching
to the person of the obligor and his patrimony as a whole as
all other obligations do, attaches only to a particular immovable.
The debtor is not bound except as owner of the immovable and
he may avoid this obligation by abandoning or alienating the
immovable. In this case, the obligation will be transferred to
the new owner of the immovable. Courts and writers also clas-
sify as an obligatio propter rem the duties owed to the mort-
gagee by one acquiring an immovable subject to mortgage.
The acquirer of the immovable is not personally responsible
for the payment of the debt, but, if the debt is not paid, he
52. Id. at 52 (and cases cited).
53. Id. at 47.
54. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 36-37 (1957); GINOSSAR, DROIT RBEL,
PROPHIATt ET CRtANCE 89-106 (1960) ; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITt THEORIQUE
ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, 5 SUPPLEMENT by Bonnecase 314-436 (1930).
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must suffer the consequences of foreclosure proceedings. His
responsibility is limited to this immovable and derives from his
ownership of the immovable.
Further, several personal rights have acquired characteristics
traditionally associated with real rights. Thus, the contract of
lease may be set up against the lessor's successor in title (Article
1743) and availability of the right of retention (jus retentionis)
may result in preferential treatment of ordinary creditors. This
right entitles any creditor who is in possession of a thing be-
longing to his debtor to keep it until the indebtedness is paid
(Article 1612). Conversely, real rights are frequently inter-
woven with personal rights and liabilities. Abusive or abnormal
exercise of the right of ownership may give birth to an obliga-
tion for the repair of the damage caused to neighbors; and law-
ful exercise of the right of ownership, as in the case of one claim-
ing a thing from a bona fide possessor, may generate an obliga-
tion for compensation of expenses.
III. LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Civil Code has incorporated either expressly
or by clear implication a number of assumptions, maxims, and
doctrinal ideas which form the substratum of the civilian tradi-
tion. The distinction of rights into patrimonial and extra-patri-
monial, and the division of the latter into "personal" and "real,"
may thus be regarded as inherent in the Code and may be for-
mally established by reference to several articles.
A. Distiction of Personal and Real Rights
A personal right (obligation) may be defined as the legal
power that a person (obligee) has to demand from another per-
son (obligor) a performance consisting in giving, doing, or not
doing a thing (Articles 1761, 1883, 3182). The Louisiana Su-
preme Court declared in Reagan v. Murphy that "a personal
right . . . defines man's relationship to man and refers merely
to an obligation one owes to another which may be declared only
against the obligor."55 As in France, obligations in Louisiana
ultimately result in financial responsibility of the obligor. His
entire patrimony may be seized and sold in case of non-perform-
55. Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210, 214 (1958), quoted ver-
batim in Harwood Oil and Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So. 2d 764(1960).
19631.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ance for the satisfaction of the obligee's claim (Articles 1968,
3182).
In Louisiana real rights are not ghosts of the legal past, but
an accepted category of very important patrimonial interests.
The term "real rights" is employed in the Civil Code,5 statutory
legislation, 57 the Code of Civil Procedure, 5s and in Louisiana
jurisprudence.5 9 Yet this term has not been legislatively defined,
and, for this reason, characterization of a right as "real" may
still be a controversial issue in concrete cases. Definition of real
rights, and determination of their juridical nature, would ob-
viously furnish criteria for the classification of certain contro-
versial rights as personal or real. In turn, classification would
entail practical consequences ranging from the applicability of
the rules governing prescription of non-use6° to the availability
of the possessory and petitory actions61 and the effect of the
right as against a particular person or against the world.
Definition of real rights, and determination of their juridical
nature, has been made in a number of Louisiana cases. In Rea-
gan v. Murpfy62 and in Harwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black,65 two
cases involving mineral leases, the Louisiana Supreme Court de-
clared that "the term 'real right' under the civil law is synony-
mous with proprietary interest, both of which refer to a species
of ownership. Ownership defines the relation of man to things
and may, therefore, be declared against the world." Comment-
ing on this definition, an able student observed that "the court
has restricted the use of the term 'real right' to an interest in
property as owner" and that "this restriction is difficult to
56. See, e.g., LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 490, 492, 1904, 3454, 3529 (1870). Cf. LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 487 (1870) : "There may be different kinds of rights to things:
1. A full and entire ownership. 2. A right to the mere use and enjoyment. 3. A
right to certain servitudes due upon immovable estates."
57. See, e.g., LA. ACTS 1938, No. 205, as amended, La. Acts 1950, No. 6;
LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950).
58. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3651-56, 3658-64 (1960).
59. See, e.g., Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958) ; Calhoun
v. Gulf Refining Co., 235 La. 494, 104 So.2d 547 (1958) ; Munn v. Wadley, 192
La. 874, 189 So. 561 (1939) ; Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) ;
Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassel, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936) ; Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
60. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 789, 3529 (1870). Cf. Reagan v. Murphy, 235
La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958); Munn v. Wadley, 192 La. 874, 189 So. 561
(1939) ; Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) ; Frost-Johnson Lum-
ber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
61. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3651-64 (1960). Cf. Gulf Re-
fining Co. v. Glassel, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
62. 235 La. 529, 541, 105 So.2d 210, 214 (1958).
63. 240 La. 641, 651, 124 So.2d 764, 767 (1960).
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reconcile with the use that the court has previously made of the
term," i.e., characterization of building restrictions and real
mortgages as real rights.6 4 Indeed, the use of the term "propri-
etary interests" may be confusing. However, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court apparently intended to define real rights as dis-
memberments of ownership. This definition accords fully with
historical developments within the civilian tradition and with
French doctrine and jurisprudence. According to the prevailing
view in France, which has been followed in Louisiana by an un-
broken line of decisions, "the rights of use, enjoyment, and dis-
posal are said to be the three elements of property in things.
They constitute the iura in re."6 5 Within certain broad limits,
these elements are susceptible of further subdivision. And in
this light it appears that real mortgage and building restrictions
may be regarded as dismemberments of ownership, and particu-
larly of the right to alienate. 66
Be this as it may, there can be no simple answer to the ques-
tion "which are the real rights in Louisiana?" The answer neces-
sarily presupposes two steps of analysis: first, identification of
rights generally recognized as "real"; and second, determination
of other rights which function in a similar way as the generally
accepted real rights. In both instances, it might be interesting
to verify conceptual generalizations by the tests of functional
analysis. In the following discussion the question will be dealt
with separately under (1) the Civil Code and (2) the Louisiana
jurisprudence and statutory legislation.
B. Real Rights: The Civil Code
There can be no doubt that the rights of owmership, use, hab-
itation, usufruct, predial servitudes, pledge, and real mortgage
are real rights under the Louisiana Civil Code. 67 This is the
64. Comment, Real Rights in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REV. 462, 463 (1961).(1961).
65. In re Morgan R. & S.S. Co., 32 La. Ann. 371, 375 (1880), quoted in
Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958) and Harwood Oil and
Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So. 2d 764 (1960).
66. See Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 737, 67 So. 641
(1915).
67. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 487 (1870) ("kinds of rights to things") ; arts.
488-532 (ownership); arts. 533-625 (usufruct); arts. 626-45 (use and habita-
tion); arts. 646-59, 709-822 (predial servitudes) 3133-181 (pledge) ; and 3278-
411 (mortgage). Mortgage, usufruct, use, and servitudes have been termed 'real
rights" expressly. See LA. CxVIL CODE arts. 490, 3282 (1870). See also Gibson
v. Zylks, 186 La. 1043, 173 So. 757 (1937) (usufruct a real right) ; Schexnaider
v. Fontenot, 147 La. 467, 85 So. 207 (1920) ; Landry v. Hawkins, 156 So. 795
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traditional enumeration- accepted as valid among civilians at
the time the Louisiana Code was promulgated.68 Scattered pro-
visions in the Code verify the authenticity of the list: these
rights, being "real," cannot exist apart from their object, may be
asserted against the world, include the right of preference and
the right to follow, and are susceptible of abandonment and pos-
session. All these distinguishing features and attributes of real
rights are there by virtue of provisions of substantive law.
The inclusion of the right of pledge (pawn and antichresis)
in the list of real rights under the Louisiana Civil Code may seem
questionable to contemporary Louisiana lawyers. Indeed, legal
usage in the state tends to associate the term "real rights" with
rights in immovable property. This, however, was not the usage
at the time the first Louisiana Civil Code was enacted; "real
rights" could exist in both movables and immovables. And, as
has been shown, the right of pledge, as well as ownership, use,
and usufruct, of movables have all the substantive characteristics
of real rights. Restricted application of the term "real rights"
to interests in immovable property is meaningful only in the
framework of the Louisiana Civil Procedure: "real actions" are
available only to holders of real rights in immovable property.6 9
The question may arise whether the Louisiana Civil Code has
established real rights other than those enumerated. French
commentators elaborating on provisions with exact equivalents
in the Louisiana Code have discussed the question whether the
list should be augmented by the addition of possession, super-
ficies, emphyteusis, and, perhaps, predial lease.
1. Possession. - The question concerning the nature of pos-
session is an old one. In the preparatory works of the French
Civil Code there were certain indications that possession was re-
garded as a real right.7 0 The Code, however, as finally promul-
gated, remained silent on the question; and controversies among
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) (mortgage a real right). Cf. Smith v. Johnson, 35 La.
Ann. 943 (1883).
68. See 9 OUEVRES DE POTMIER, TRAITI DU DROIT DE DOMAINE DE PROPRIfTil
101 (1861). Pothier did not list pledge and mortgage among the dismemberments
of ownership. However, there can be no doubt that the redactors of the Louisiana
Civil Code considered both mortgage and pledge as real rights. Article 3282 of
the'Civil Code declares that mortgage is "a real right' and Article 3279 declares
that mortgage is a "species of pledge." Cf. 1 ORTOLAN, EXPLICATION HISTORIQUE
DES INSTITUTS DE L'EMPEREUR JUSTINIEN 90 (1851).
69. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3651-64 (1960).
70. See'3 FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PRBPARATOIRES DU CODE
CIVIL 459-60 (1836). .
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French commentators on the juridical nature of possession were
to be expected. Demolombe asserted that civil possession is a
real right.71 This conclusion was based on the observation that
the rights accorded to one having the civil possession of a thing
do not derive from personal obligations assumed by third parties
and also on the presumption of ownership that Article 2779 of
the Civil Code establishes.
The controversy concerning the juridical nature of possession
may be interesting from the viewpoint of legal philosophy but
does not involve practical consequences in Louisiana. In any
case, Article 2779 of the French Civil Code does not have an
equivalent in the Louisiana Code; and Article 3434 of the Lou-
isiana Code, which has no equivalent in the French Civil Code,
declares that "possession implies a right and a fact; the right to
enjoy annexed to the right of ownership, and the fact of the real
detention of the thing that is in the hands of the master or of
another for him." This article seems to indicate that possession,
whether as factual control recognized and protected by the law
or as a right to such control, should be regarded as a sui generis
right, neither personal nor real. This view is in accord with the
historical sources of the Louisiana Civil Code and with contem-
porary continental doctrine.72
2. Superficies. - "Superficies" is a technical term of the
Roman law referring collectively to buildings, constructions,
trees, plants, crops, and generally all objects adhering to the sur-
face of the soil. 73 In ancient Roman law, these objects were re-
garded as component parts of the ground insusceptible of separ-
ate ownership or other real rights. The owner of the ground was
always owner of the superficies as well as of the sub-soil. In case
of alienation of the superficies by the owner with reservation of
the ground, the purchaser or other acquirer did not obtain own-
ership or a real right but only a personal right against the land-
owner. Later on in the development of Roman law, however, the
Praetor came to the assistance of the acquirer of the superficies
(superficiary) and granted him an actio in rem utilis and a spe-
cial interdict, causa cognita, if the alienation of the superficies
71. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITl DE LA DISTINCTION DE DIENS 366 (1874-82).
72. Cf. 3 ENNECCERUS-KIPP-WOLFF, SACHENRECHT 19 (1957); BALIS, LAW
OF THINGS 3-7 (1955) ; But see 2 MAASDORP'S INSTITUTES OF SOUTH AFRICAN
LAW, THE LAW OF THINGS 11 (1960) (possession termed a "real right").
73. See SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS 339(1923) ; WEISS, INSTITUTIONEN DES ROMISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 236 (1949); 9
DEMOIOMBE, TRAITI DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 368 (1874-82).
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was made in perpetuity or for a long period of time.74 As a re-
sult of the Praetorian protection, the right of superficies came to
be regarded as a dismemberment of the right of ownership.
Superficies could be transferred in part or in whole to heirs and
other assigns, could be charged with servitudes and usufruct,
could be partitioned, and could be acquired by acquisitive pre-
scription.
Superficies was a firmly established institution in prerevolu-
tionary France. The holder of the superficies or surface rights
was known as domanier and the owner of the ground as trdfon-
cier.75 The French Civil Code does not mention this institution
by name but a number of articles seem to indicate that the insti-
tution was preserved in substance. Article 553 provides that a
person other than the owner of the ground may acquire by pre-
scription or title the ownership of all or part of a building be-
longing to another. Further, Article 664 indicates that apart-
ments in the same building may belong to different owners. And
Article 519 declares that wind mills and water mills erected on
piles in navigable and floatable rivers are immovable by nature,
although the bed of these rivers is a part of the public domain.
Thus, superficies is regarded in France as a veritable real right
and proprietary interest, corporeal, and immovable by its nature
under Article 518 of the Code. It is an estate susceptible of
alienation, mortgage, usufruct, servitude, and seizure according
to the rules governing immovable property. Further, superficies
is susceptible of acquisitive prescription and may be protected
by the petitory and possessory actions. In spite of its similarity
to ownership, use, usufruct and servitudes, superficies is regard-
ed as a distinct real right. The respective rights of the owner of
the ground and the superficiary are determined by reference to
contractual provisions and the code articles governing servitudes
and usufruct, applied by analogy.7 6 The fact that the French
Civil Code has not included provisions regulating the institution
of superficies by detailed provisions has been regretted in
France.7 7 In Belgium, the deficiency of the Code Napoleon was
corrected by legislation in 1824. The Law of January 16, 1824,
74. See D.43.18.1.3
75. See 9 DEMOLOMnE, TRAIT"r DE LA DISTINCTION DES wINS 370 (1874-82).
76. Of. Cass., March 6, 1861, D.61.1.418; Nov. 5, 1866, D.67.1.32, S.66.1.411;
April 27, 1891, D.92.1.219, S.91.1.369; Nov. 7, 1860, D.60.1.486; Besancon, Dec.
12, 1864, D.65.2.1, S.65.2.197; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TBAITP PHATIQUE DE DROIT
CI IL FANgqiS 324-28 (1952).
77. See 9 DEI-OLOMBE, THAIt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 372 (1874-82).
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regulated with considerable detail the rights of superficies and
emphyteusis. According to Article 4 of this statute the right of
superficies cannot be established for a period exceeding fifty
years, but can be extended by agreement after the lapse of fifty
years.78
In Louisiana, the right of superficies should be regarded as
established by the Civil Code. Article 664 of the French Civil
Code has no equivalent in the Louisiana Code. But Article 506
of the Louisiana Code reproduces verbatim Article 553 of the
French Code and declares that "all the constructions, plantations
and works, made on or within the soil, are supposed to be done
by the owner, and at his expense and to belong to him, unless
the contrary be proved, without prejudice to the rights of third
persons, who have acquired or may acquire by prescription the
property of a subterraneous piece of ground under the building
of another, or any part of the building." Further, Article 464 of
the Louisiana Civil Code declares that "land and buildings or
other constructions, whether they have their foundation in the
soil or not, are immovable by nature." This provision is suffi-
ciently broad to include the rule of Article 519 of the French
Code which is nothing else but a specific application thereof. The
legislative history of Article 464 sustains this view beyond the
shade of a doubt. In the 1808 Code, Article 15, p. 96, provided
that "land and buildings are immoveable by nature" and the fol-
lowing Article 16 in the same page declared that "wind mills and
water mills fixed upon posts, and being part of the building are
likewise immoveable, by their nature." This last article, repro-
ducing in essence the text of Article 519 of the French Code, was
suppressed in the revision of 1825 on the recommendation of the
redactors as "useless," since it was "included in the general pro-
vison contained in the preceding article."79 This "general pro-
vision" is that one contained in Article 15, p. 96, of the 1808
Code, which as amended in 1825, was carried in the 1870 Code
as Article 464. A comment by the redactors to the 1825 amend-
ment stated that "the alienation which a proprietor makes of the
land, carries with it the buildings erected thereon, whether these
buildings have a foundation in the land or not, unless there be an
express reservation to the contrary. This is what we wished to
78. See DEKKERS, PR]lCIS DE DROIT civIL BELGE 799 (1954-55). Cf. GERMAN
CIVIL CODE arts. 1012-17.
79. See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODEB
OF LOUISIANA 37 (1937).
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establish by the addition which we have made to this article."
(Emphasis added.) 80
The omission from the Louisiana Civil Code of an article cor-
responding to Article 664 of the French Code could be taken as
an indication of legislative policy against the recognition of own-
ership in individual apartments, and, perhaps, of superficiary
rights in general. Yet, this conclusion would be in irreconcilable
conflict with Articles 506 and 464 of the Civil Code and with the
comment of the redactors of the 1825 Code which states clearly
that one may, by express reservation, alienate the ground and
retain the superficies. And if one can do this there is no reason
why one should not be permitted to retain the ground and alien-
ate the superficies. Further, Article 506 states that one may
prove that he owns the superficies and that third persons may
acquire by prescription "the ground under the building of an-
other, or any part of the building." Thus, the omission of an
article corresponding to Article 464 of the French Civil Code
should be regarded as unintentional. Silence cannot be inter-
preted, and in any case, more weight should be given to provi-
sions enacted in the Code than to possible interpretations of an
omission.
Louisiana courts in the past, stressing the classification of
buildings in the Code as immovables by nature, and apparently
proceeding on the traditional Romanist assumption that owner-
ship of immovables is not susceptible of horizontal division, held
that buildings were insusceptible of separate ownership or other
real rights distinct from those existing in the ground.8' Thus a
sale of a house apart from the grounds on which it was situated
was declared invalid.82 Gradually, however, the issue of im-
movability was divorced from the question of ownership and the
traditional assumption of horizontal indivisibility became for-
gotten; and it became settled in Louisiana that one may own a
building erected on the land of another. 83 Cases indicate that
80. Ibid.
81. See Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Compara-
tive Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517, 523 (1962).
82. See Boyle v. Swanson, 6 La. Ann. 263 (1851).
83. See Buehler v. Fourroux,' 193 La. 445, 190 So. 640 (1939) Lange v.
Baranco, 32 La. Ann. 697 (1880) ; Keary v. Ducote, 23 La. Ann. 196 (1871);
Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 154 So. 760 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1934) ; Scardino v. Maggio, 15 La. App. 444, 131 So. 217 (1st
Cir. 1931) ; Dougherty v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 9 La. App. 295, 119 So. 543
(1st Cir. 1928) (a barn on leased premises owned by tenant); Di Crispino v.
Bares, 5 Orl. App. 69, 71 (La. App. 1908) ("In no sense can this house owned
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this separate ownership of buildings may derive from lease,
which in order to affect interests of third parties must be re-
corded,8 and also from express reservation in case of transfer
of title to the land. 5 Presumably, the same result could be ob-
tained by the separate sale of buildings. Whether similar rights
may be acquired by acquisitive prescription is at best question-
able, in spite of the declaration of Article 506.86 But it is certain
that horizontal division of lands and buildings in Louisiana can-
not be affected by judicial partition in kind. This was the nar-
row holding of Lasyone v. Emerson,8 7 a case decided by the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court in 1952.
The decisions which recognized separate ownership in build-
ings in effect re-introduced the concept of superficies in Louisi-
ana law. The superficiary rights are akin to full ownership and
Louisiana courts are, perhaps, justified to use the word "owner-
ship."' 8 Use of the word "superficies" may be preferable, how-
ever, for purposes of accurate analysis. The word "ownership"
could be reserved to designate complete or perfect ownership in-
cluding both title to lands and title to buildings. Superficiary
rights fall short of complete ownership in that they are frequent-
ly limited by contractual provisions and are due to terminate
upon expiration of the term for which they are granted. 9
3. Emphyteusis. - Emphyteusis was an institution of Greek
law90 borrowed by Roman law. It was a contract according to
which one delivered to another a piece of land either in per-
petuity or for a long period of time, the recipient undertaking
the obligation to cultivate the land and to pay an annual rent.9 1
Originally, the right of emphyteusis could be established only in
lands belonging to the Roman people, municipalities, and other
by one person and built on the land of another, be deemed inseparable from the
land, from the standpoint of either fact or law.")
84. See Louisiana Land & Pecan Co. v. Gulf Lumber Co., 134 La. 784, 64 So.
713 (1914) ; Vaughn v. Kemp, 4 La. App. 682 (2d Cir. 1926).
85. Cf. Prevot v. Courtney, 241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961) ; Green v. Small,
227 La. 401, 79 So. 2d 497 (1955) ; Smith v. Bell, 224 La. 1, 68 So. 2d 737 (1953)
Bacque v. Darby, 69 So.2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) (dicta).
86. Cf. text following note 78 supra.
87. 220 La. 951, 57 So. 2d 906 (1952). Cf. text at note 120 itfra.
88. See notes 83-84 supra.
89. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 490, 2726 (1870).
90. Emphyteusis derives from the Greek verb, which means to plant or to
cultivate.
- 91. See SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES RMISCHEN RECHTS 335
(1923); WEIss, INSTITUTIONEN DES ROMISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 238 (1949); 1
HUVELIN, COURS ALtMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 588 (1927).;.9. DEMOL0MBE,
TRAIT# DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 373 (1874-82).
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public corporations (agri vertigales) but, later on, lands belong-
ing to the Emperor and also lands owned by private individuals
became susceptible of emphyteusis (agri emphyteutarii).
The juridical nature of the right of emphyteusis in Roman
law was not clear, as it included characteristics of both real and
personal rights. The recipient of the land, the empyteuta, was
under obligation to pay to the landowner an annual rent, the
emphyteutic canon, which seemed to indicate that ownership re-
mained in the landowner, and that the contract was similar to a
predial lease. On the other hand, the emphyteuta acquired a real
right in the land, since he could exercise the possessory and peti-
tory actions in his name and could transfer or encumber his right
by mortgage, usufruct, or servitudes. Further, the emphyteuta
paid taxes, made all repairs at his expense, could change the sub-
stance of the thing, and had no right to demand reduction of the
canon in case of reduced productivity. These features had noth-
ing to do with a contract of lease and were more compatible with
the idea of sale. But again, emphyteusis could not be regarded
as an outright sale of the land: the emphyteuta could not trans-
fer his right without the consent of the landowner, had no right
to mines not opened, was not entitled to a treasure found in the
land, and was under obligation to pay an annual rent - all these
being features incompatible with the notion of ownership. Nor
could emphyteusis be regarded as a usufruct: unlike a usufruc-
tuary, the emphyteuta was under obligation to make all repairs;
and also unlike the right of usufruct, emphyteusis did not termi-
nate with the death of the emphyteuta. Emphyteusis thus had
characteristics of lease, usufruct, and ownership and in reality
was a sui generis dismemberment of the right of ownership. This
was at least the conclusion of Emperor Zenon: "Jus emphyteuti-
carium neque conductionis, neque alienationis esse titulis addi-
cendum, sed hoc jus tertium.' '92
In medieval French law, emphyteusis was effectively com-
bined with feudal tenures.9 3 Both cultivated and uncultivated
lands, and buildings, became susceptible of the right of emphy-
teusis, but difficult legal questions concerning the nature of the
institution and the respective rights and duties of the parties
remained unanswered. In the revolutionary period, Title 1, Ar-
ticle 1, of the Law of December 18/19, 1790, abolished perpetual
92. JUSTINIAN, CODE 4.66.1.
93. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 376 (1874-82).
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emphyteusis. According to a generally accepted view in France
this rule was carried into the Code Napoleon (Article 530). A
contract purporting to establish the right of emphyteusis, how-
ever, is not null and void. According to the jurisprudence of the
Court of Cassation this contract transfers complete ownership
in the lands, and the rent which is the consideration for the
transfer is redeemable. 94 Emphyteusis for a period not exceeding
99 years was not touched by the revolutionary legislation and
controversies arose in France over recognition of this institution
in the Civil Code. Although the Code did not use the technical
term "emphyteusis," it was argued that the institution was pre-
served either as a right of enjoyment under Article 543 or as a
right of ownership under the same article. Further, it was
argued that the institution ought to be preserved as it enabled
persons cultivating the lands to obtain rights greater than those
accorded by the establishment of a servitude or usufruct. This is
the view which prevailed in doctrine and jurisprudence. 95 The
Court of Cassation declared that "the rules concerning emphyteu-
sis are neither altered nor modified by the Code Napoleon"'9 6 and
that "the emphyteuta possesses as owner the immovable which is
transferred to him for a certain period of time. '97 These de-
cisions were strongly criticized by Demolombe, who advanced
legal and economic arguments bolstering the conclusion that the
French Civil Code did not, and should not, recognize the institu-
tion of emphyteusis, whether for a limited period of time or in
perpetuity. 98 Indeed, the Court of Cassation later proved to be
inconsistent with itself when it announced that "the right of
ownership is not susceptible of division in time."99
In Louisiana, emphyteusis is established and regulated by the
Civil Code as "rent of lands."'1 The 1808 Code did not include
any relevant provisions, but in the 1825 revision the redactors
"thought it necessary to supply this omission" since "the contract
of rent, is now pretty common among us."''1 "Rent of lands" is
94. See Cass. Dec. 15, 1824, S.1824.1.596.
95, 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 986
(1952). Cf. Cass., April 1, 1840, S.40.1.433, 436; July 24, 1843, S.43.1.830;
May 18, 1847, D.47.1.176, S.47.1.623. Today the institution of emphyteusis is
regulated in France by the Law of June 25, 1902 as incorporated into the Rural
Code.
96. Cass. July 18, 1832, [1832] JOURNAL DU PALAIS, 1293, 1296.
97. Cass. April 1, 1840, 8.40.1.433, 435.
98. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITk DE LE DISTINCTION DES BIENS 382-92 (1874-82).
99. Cass. July 8, 1851, D.51.1.198, 199, S.51.1.628, 683.
100. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2779-92 (1870).
101. See 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL
CODES OF LOUISIANA 326 (1937).
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defined as "a contract by which one of the parties conveys and
cedes to the other a track [tract] of land, or any other immovable
property, and stipulates that the latter shall hold it as owner, but
reserving to the former an annual rent of a certain sum of
money, or of a certain quantity of fruits, which the other party
binds himself to pay him" (Article 2779). The contract must be
made in perpetuity; if made for a limited time only, it is classi-
fied as a lease (Article 2780). The contract is said to partake of
the nature of both sale and lease (Article 2780) and, in principle,
is governed by the same rules governing sale unless otherwise
provided for in the Code (Article 2783). By special provision it
is indicated that the contract, unlike a sale, does not convey com-
plete ownership: the purchaser "is bound to preserve the thing
in good condition that it may continue capable of producing here-
with to pay the rent" (Article 2784). In case of partial loss of
the thing, the rent is reducible in proportion, and in case of total
loss the rent charge is extinguished (Article 2785). The rent fol-
lows the thing in the hands of any acquirer (Article 2786) ; but
the obligation of the latter is merely real, except for arrears ac-
crued while he was in possession of the thing (Article 2787).
The rent charge is redeemable despite stipulations to the con-
trary, which may exclude redemption only for a period not ex-
ceeding thirty years (Article 2788). The rentor has a right of
mortgage on the property and can seize it for rent due in excess
of a year (Article 2791). The rent charge is susceptible of mort-
gage, except where it has been established gratuitously for the
benefit of a third person on the condition that it should not be
subject to seizure (Article 2792). These provisions indicate that
"rent of lands" or emphyteusis is clearly a real right in Louisi-
ana, when established in perpetuity. When established for a lim-
ited period of time, it is clearly a contract of lease under the Code
and its nature as a real or personal right will depend on the
answer to the question whether a predial lease is a real or per-
sonal right under the Louisiana Civil Code.10 2 Although tem-
porary emphyteusis is not recognized in the Louisiana Civil Code,
the jurisprudence developed a doctrine which in effect intro-
duced into Louisiana law a species of temporary emphyteusis. In
Porche v. Bodin'0 3 the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that
the lessee of an immovable is the owner of standing crops, in
spite of the broad declaration of Article 465 of the Civil Code
102.. See text at notes 105-112 inIra.
103. 28 La. Ann. 761 (1876).
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that growing crops are component parts of the land.10 4 Thus, for
all practical purposes, a lessee cultivating the ground possesses a
real right in the crops which is termed "ownership" but clearly
approximates emphyteusis. In these circumstances, standing
crops are classified as movables, and, therefore, the interest of
the lessee should be regarded as a real right in corporeal movable
property.
4. Predial Lease. - Traditionally, the contract of lease has
been regarded by civilian writers as establishing only personal
rights. This was the prevailing view in France even after the
promulgation of the Civil Code, until Troplong advanced the view
that the contract of lease generated a real right.1 0 5 This view
was based on Article 1743 of the French Civil Code which de-
clares that "if the lessor sells the leased thing, the acquirer can-
not evict the farmer or lessee, unless this right is reserved in the
contract of lease." According to Troplong this effect of the con-
tract of lease could be explained only on one of two grounds:
either the purchaser assumes an obligation vis-a-vis the lessee
(which is not the case), or the right of the lessee is a real right
and can be asserted against the world. Doctrine and jurispru-
dence, however, as a whole, continued to maintain the view that
the contract of lease does not create real rights. Article 1709 of
the Civil Code defines lease as "a contract whereby one of the
parties undertakes the obligation to furnish to the other the en-
joyment of a thing for a certain period of time, in consideration
of a certain price which the latter promises to pay him." This
definition has been taken almost verbatim from Pothier who did
not entertain any doubts as to the personal nature of the contract
of lease.106 Further, it has been stated that the contract of lease
produces all the effects of personal rights and none of the effects
of real rights. The lessee cannot abandon the thing, nor can he
bring an action against third possessors (Article 1727) ; the
lessee may demand the delivery of the thing from the lessor
(Article 1719), is entitled to reduction of rent in case of loss of
fruits without his fault (Articles 1769, 1770), and avoids all re-
sponsibility in case of total loss of the thing due to fortuitious
events (Article 1722). In this light, it is difficult to see how
. 104. See Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovable8 in Louisiana and Compara-
tive Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517, 520 (1962).
105. See 1 TROPLONG, DE L'ECHANGE ET DU LOUAGE 60 (1859). Cf. note 25
supra.
106. See 4 OEUVBES DE POTHIER, TRAITk DU CONTRAT DE LOUAGE 2 (1861).
Cf. 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT]t DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 395 (1874-82).
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Article 1743 could upset the scheme of the Code. This article
merely determines that the acquirer of a thing leased succeeds
to the personal obligations contracted between lessor and lessee,
assumes the position of the lessor, and is subrogated to his rights
and duties. This is a legal obligation imposed for reasons of
social and economic utility. Even at the time Pothier wrote, a
successor to a thing leased could not evict the tenant before
termination of the cultivation period. This rule was grounded
on "charity and equity.' '10 7
The provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code governing lease
are almost identical in substance with those of the French Code.
These provisions indicate that the contract of lease generates
personal rights though, by operation of law, one acquiring a
thing leased is subrogated to the rights and duties of the former
owner. Yet, Article 2015 of the Civil Code, which has no equiva-
lent in the French Code, declares that leases "form real obliga-
tions." This could be taken to mean that the contract of lease
creates real rights as correlative to the real obligations of Article
2015. Louisiana courts, however, have in recent years consistent-
ly classified leases as involving rights ad rem rather than in re. 08
This classification applies to all predial leases whether made for
a short or a long period of time'0 9 and whether recorded or not.
Recordation may enable the lessee to assert his rights against
third persons but does not alter the nature of those rights. The
right of the lessee is always a personal right against the land-
owner to let him enjoy the thing; and if the landowner does not
perform his obligation, the lessee's remedy is an action for dam-
ages. The predial lessee has no standing to bring the petitory
107. See 4 OEUVRES DE POTIfIER, TRAITP, DU CONTRAT DE LOUAGE 105 (1861).
108. See Harwood Oil and Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So.2d 764
(1960) ; Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958) ; Calhoun v. Gulf
Refining Co., 235 La. 494, 104 So.2d 547 (1958) ; Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassel,
186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936). Cf. In re Morgan R.R. & S.S. Co., 32 La.
Ann. 371 (1880). But cf. Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v. Levy, 191 So. 747 (La.
App. 1939) ; Coyle v. Geoghegan, 187 La. 308, 1.74 So. 366 (1937) (predial lease
is a real obligation); Manteris Co. v. Baton Rouge Poster Advertising Co., 12
La. App. 162, 125 So. 293 (1.929) (real obligation, real right) ; Canal & Clai-
borne R.R. v. Orleans R.B., 44 La. Ann. 54, 10 So. 389 (1892) (real obligation,
servitude) ; Burke v. Wall, 29 La. Ann. 38 (1877) (real obligation).
109. See Comment, Long-Y'erm Lease8 Affecting Minerals, 8 LA. L. REV. 540
(1948). The Louisiana Civil Code does not specifically regulate the long-term
lease. Article 2684 provides that "the duration and the conditions of leases are
generally regulated by contract, or by mutual consent," but Article 2474 requires
that leases be granted "during a certain time." Corresponding provisions in the
French Civil Code have been interpreted to limit the maximum duration of a
lease to ninety-nine years. See 10 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, THAITP, PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS 574 (1856).
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or possessory action. 110 But it remains to be seen whether the
"ownership""' which lessees may have in immovables on leased
ground is a right that can be asserted against the world in the
lessee's own name and whether such a lessee may avail himself
of the real actions." 2 So far, decisions recognizing this "owner-
ship" merely involved contests between persons acquiring title to
the land, and claiming improvements on the premises by virtue
of their title, and lessees asserting their own rights to the im-
provements according to the provisions of their lease.
5. Party Autonomy. - Question has arisen in Louisiana as
to whether the real rights established in the Code may be altered
and modified by contract, and whether the parties to a contract
may create real rights not regulated by the Code. There is no
specific declaration of legislative policy in the Code, except, as in
France, an obvious balance between the policy favoring con-
tractual freedom and social interests embodied in the notion of
public policy." 3 In France, we have seen, doctrine and jurispru-
dence are settled that the parties to a contract may in their exer-
cise of contractual freedom modify existing real rights or create
new ones within certain limits." 4 Article 487 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, corresponding to Article 543 of the French Code, de-
clares that "there may be different kinds of rights to things:
1. A full and entire ownership. 2. A right to the mere use and
enjoyment. 3. A right to certain servitudes due upon immovable
estates." This article could be interpreted as listing all the per-
missible dismemberments of ownership in Louisiana. But, under
the influence of French jurisprudence and doctrine, Louisiana
courts have treated this article as merely illustrative.1 5 In
110. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3656 (1960). In contrast to the
predial lessee, the mineral lessee "is the owner of a real right"; accordingly, he
has a standing to bring the petitory and possessory actions. Id. art. 3664.
111. See text at note 83 supra.
112. Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3651-3664 (1960).
113. See text at notes 31-32 supra; Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136
La. 724, 728, 67 So. 641, 643 (1915): "[W]hile the public policy of the state
opposes the putting of property out of commerce, it at the same time favors the
fullest liberty of contract (article 1764, C.C.), and the widest latitude possible
in the right to dispose of one's property as one lists (article 491, C.C.) so long
as no disposition is sought to be made contrary to good morals, public order, or
express law."
114. Cf. text at notes 32-33 supra; Queensborough v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724,
729, 67 So. 641, 643 (1915) ("In France . . .public policy in this regard, as
indeed, in the case of every enlightened nation, is the same as ours").
115. Cf. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915)
the enumeration of real rights in Article 487 of the Civil Code is, indeed, in-
complete. This enumeration refers only to the so-called principal real rights. Cf.
9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 356 (1874-82) (elaborating
an Article 543 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to Article 487 of the
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Queenmborough Land Co. v. Cazeau,116 which involved the valid-
ity of a restriction on alienation, the Louisiana Supreme Court
quoted extensively from Toullier and other French commentators
and adopted the view that, in principle, the parties to a contract
may create real rights "apart and beyond" those created in the
Civil Code, subject to a close judicial scrutiny in the general in-
terest of the public. As in France, however, and perhaps for the
same reasons, little use of this facility has been made in practice.
Perhaps the most important examples of real rights created by
the exercise of contractual freedom are mineral servitudes, min-
eral royalties and building restrictions discussed in detail in
another part of this study.117
Louisiana Code) ; thus mortgage and pledge, accessory real rights, are not men-
tioned. The question whether accessory real rights are or are not dismember-
ments of ownership is a controversial issue. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT]t DE LA
DISTINCTION DES BIENS 353-56 (1874-82) ; GINOSSAR, DROIT R EL, PROPRItT l ET
CRItANCE 148 (1960). Cf. Shaw v. Watson, 151 La. 893, 92 So. 375 (1922) (real
mortgage not a dismemberment of ownership: dicta).
116. 136 La. 724, 736, 67 So. 641, 645 (1915). This case furnishes the back-
bone of Louisiana doctrine: "As stated by article 491 of the Code, ownership is
composed of the rights to use, to enjoy, and to dispose of. These three constituent
elements of the ownership bear in the civil law the designation given to them in
the Roman law: The usus, the fructus, and abusus. The two first of these
elements the use and the usufruct, are admittedly susceptible of separation from
the other elements and of subdivision after having been segregated; why then is
not the third, the abusus, or right to dispose of, susceptible of being dealt with in
like manner? . . . The right to alienate is but one of the constitutent elements
of the right to dispose of . . . so may this right to alienate, a subdivision of the
abusus, be, in turn, subdivided ....
117. See text at notes 14149, 173-204, 234-57 infra: in general, the attitude
of the Louisiana courts has been cautious. It has been said that "the modifica-
tions of the right of property under our laws are few and easily understood, and
answer all the purposes of reasonable use. It is incumbent on courts to maintain
them in their simplicity." Harper v. Stanbrough, 2 La. Ann. 377, 382 (1847) ;
Ownership may be dismembered (i.e., real rights may be created) only within
certain broad limits prescribed by the Code and the notion of public policy. See
Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915). The law
does not open "the door to an unregulated brood of real rights." Louisiana & A.
Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403, 426 (1911). Thus,
perpetual restrictions on alienation are invalid. Female Orphan Society v. Young
Men's Christian Ass'n, 119 La. 278, 44 So. 15 (1907). Creation of servitudes to
do, in faciendo, is likewise illegal. Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber
Co., supra. Actually, all modifications of the right of ownership recognized as
valid by Louisiana courts, with the exception of mineral servitudes and possibly
of building restrictions, fall within the categories of predial servitudes and usu-
fruct. Building restrictions today are classified as a species of predial servitudes.
See text at notes 244-47, 255, infra. Mineral servitudes are sui generis species of
real rights: they are servitudes in favor of a person and his heirs. Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 864, 91 So. 207, 245 (1922) ; in this
case the Louisiana Supreme Court declared: "The right to establish a servitude
in favor of a person and his heirs seems to be forbidden by C.C. arts. 646, 709.
But, on the other hand, it seems to be allowed 'by C.C. arts. 607, 758, 2013. And
with these conflicting provisions before us we cannot say that the law clearly pro-
hibits the creation of a servitude upon lands in favor of a person and his heirs.
And hence, the intention of the parties should govern in such matters." This
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.C. Real Rights: Jurisprudence and Statutory Legislation
Louisiana courts have at various times classified a number of
rights as "real." 118 However, it would be misleading to rely on
isolated cases and produce a list of rights classified as "real"
merely because the term "real" was used. Perhaps, a better test
would be functional analysis and determination of rights whichproduce results ordinarily attributed to established real rights;.
Thie traditional list of real rights does not involve problems.
Though not always termed "real rights," there is ample evidence
that the rights of ownership, use, habitation, usufruct, servi-
tudes, pledge (pawn and antichresis), real mortgage, and em-
phyteusis function as real rights. The rights of ownership, use,
and usufruct are real rights whether concerning movable or im-
movable property. Pawn can obviously exist only in movables;
real mortgage, antichresis, habitation, servitudes, and emphy-
teusis can exist only in immovables. Apart from these rights
established in the Civil Code, jurisprudence and legislation in
Louisiana have created additional real rights which need be con-
sidered separately.
1. Ownership of Individual Apartments. - Recognition of
superficiary rights by the Louisiana Supreme Court in recent
years' 1 has never been carried by the courts to its logical conclu-
sion, viz., the recognition of ownership in individual apartments.
In Lasyone v. Emerson,1 20 it was held that buildings were not
susceptible of judicial partition in horizontal planes and dicta in
the same case indicated that horizontal division by voluntary acts
of the owner or co-owners holding undivided interests was like-
wise excluded. Horizontal division of buildings, however, and
ownership of individual apartments conform fully with the pre-
cepts of the Civil Code and are not contrary to contemporary
civilian notions.' 2' Further, experience in other civil law juris-
faculty, however, does not seem to have been exercised in Louisiana apart from
the fields of mineral servitudes and building restrictions.
118. Cf. Lighting Fixture Suppiy Cc,. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 146
So. 35 (1933) (lessee's right to the use and enjoyment of improvements placed
by him on the leased premises "an immovable right") ; Kingberger v. Droute, 149
La. 986, 90 So. 367 (1922) (recorded option to purchase an immovable) ; Lehman
v. Rice, 118 La. 975, 43 So. 639 (1907) (recorded option to purchase an im-
movable) ; text at notes 360-65, infra; Succession of Gamble, 23 La. Ann. 9 (1871)
.(right to -use pews in a church).
119. Cf. text at notes 83-86 supra.
.120. 220 La. 951, 57 So. 2d 906 (1952). Cf. note 87 supra.
121. Cf. text at notes 79-81, supra.
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dictions122 and common law sister states 123 has confirmed the use-
fulness of such a regime. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
Louisiana legislature passed in its 1962 session the "Horizontal
Property Act"' 24 as a piece of emergency legislation designed to
cope with contemporary needs and economic developments.
25
The act enables the "owner or the co-owners of a building"
to submit "their property to ... a horizontal property regime.' ' 2 6
Under this regime, an apartment "may be individually conveyed
and encumbered and may be the subject of ownership, possession
or sale and of all types of juridic acts inter vivos or mortis causa,
as if it were sole and entirely independent of other apartments in
the building of which it forms a part, and the corresponding in-
dividual titles and interests shall be recordable.' 27 "Apartment"
has been defined as "an enclosed space consisting of one or more
rooms occupying all or part of a floor in a building of one or
more floors or stories regardless of whether it be designated for
residence, for office, for the operation of any industry or busi-
ness, or for any other type of independent use, provided that it
has a direct exit to a thoroughfare or to a given common space
leading to a thoroughfare.' 128
The act also provides that "any apartment may be held and
owned by more than one person as joint tenants, as tenants in
common, as tenants by the entirety or in any other real estate
tenancy relationship recognized under the law of this State."'129
122. With respect to the ownership of individual apartments, see German Law
of March 15, 1951; Greek Civil Code art. 1002; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPET, TRaATA
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 262 (1952).
123. See Comment, Individual Ownership of Apartments in Louisiana, 19 LA.
L. REV. 668 (1959).
124. La. Acts 1962, No. 494, § 1. Its complete title is "an Act to provide for
the Creation of Horizontal Property Regimes and Regulation therefor." The act
shows poor draftmanship. Cf. text at notes 129-30 infra. It is regrettable that
such an important piece of civil law legislation was enacted without the expert
assistance of the Louisiana State Law Institute. Expert drafting might have
avoided a number of latent conflicts between the act and Civil Code.
125. See La. Acts 1962, No. 494, § 24: "[T]here is an urgent need to make
available housing and business location to those persons in the State who live in
areas where land costs make it impossible for them to acquire single family homes
or single unit business location and where current rentals are beyond their eco-
nomic reach; . .. construction and development of housing and business location
for such persons cannot be undertaken by private industry for lack of legislation
enabling single units in multi-unit structures to qualify for federally insured loans.
• ..Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist."
126. La. Acts 1962, No. 494, § 3.
127. Id. § 4.
128. Id. § 2(a). The definition of "apartment" is sufficiently broad to include
a single one story unit. Yet, other provisions in the act contemplate structures
of at least two units and, perhaps, of at least two stories.
129. La. Acts 1962, No. 494, § 5.
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This provision may be interpreted as introducing into Louisiana
property law common law tenures heretofore unknown in the
state. Such an interpretation might prompt the courts to declare
the provision unconstitutional under Article III, Sections 16 and
18, of the Louisiana Constitution.'3 0 The constitutionality of the
provision could be upheld either by disregarding the common law
terms or by substituting in their place civilian concepts. The
provision then could be interpreted as permitting co-ownership
of individual apartments and the creation of real rights recog-
nized under the law of the state. This construction avoids the
objection of unconstitutionality but renders the legislative dec-
laration superfluous.
The act is of a limited scope. It merely renders possible and
regulates ownership of individual apartments subjected to the
regime of "horizontal property"'13 ' by voluntary acts of the own-
er or co-owners after a building has been erected. 1'3 2 The general
question of horizontal divisibility of land ownership'3 8 and at-
tendant legal problems have not been touched upon. Thus, the
act does not affect the regime of buildings erected on the land
of another. 3 4 Nor does it disturb the narrow holding of Lasyone
v. Emerson8 5 so that, as in the past, judicial partition in kind is
not a remedy available to co-owners holding undivided interests
in buildings. Finally, words not defined in the act, like the word
130. See LA. CONST. art. III, § 16 (1921) : "Every statute enacted by the
Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of its
object." Id. art. III, § 18: "The legislature shall never adopt any system or code
of laws by general reference to such system or code of laws; but in all cases shall
recite at length the several provisions of the laws it may enact." As stated in the
title, the purpose of the act is to provide for horizontal property regimes and
regulations therefor. There is no language in the title indicating that the act was
intended to introduce common law tenures. Thus, the body of the act, insofar as
it permits common law tenures is broader than its title. Cf. Buehler v. Fourroux,
193 La. 445, 190 So. 640 (1939). From the viewpoint of legislative policy, there
seems to be no valid argument supporting the introduction of common law tenures
into Louisiana law. Nor can such legislation be justified by reference to pressing
social and economic needs.
131. The act regulates the ownership and use of the common elements (§§ 6-7)
and establishes the indivisibility of these elements (§ 8). Further, the act regu-
lates the recordation and contents of the master deed (§§ 9-11), waiver and re-
establishment of the regime (§§ 12-13), adoption and content of by-laws (§§ 14-
15), expenses of administration and contributions therefor (§§ 16-17), priority of
liens (§ 18), liabilities of the purchaser and seller (§ 19), insurance of buildings
and allocation of the proceeds (§§ 20-21), and separate taxation (§ 22).
132. See La. Acts 1962, No. 494, § 3. Language in this section seems to indi-
cate (a contrario) that the regime cannot be established before a building is erect-
ed or by judicial partition in kind.
133. Cf. White v. Frank B. Treat & Son, 230 La. 1017, 89 So. 2d 883 (1956)
(horizontal indivisibility of mineral servitudes).
134. Cf. text at notes 81-86 supra.
135. 220 La. 951, 57 So. 2d 906 (1952).
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"buildings," will be interpreted according to their settled -mean-
ing under the Civil Code and the Louisiana jurisprudence. 1 6
The owner of an individual apartment is the holder of a right
in an immovable. This right is full and complete ownership. At
the same time, the owner of an individual apartment holds an
undivided interest in the "general common elements"'137 and may
also hold an undivided interest in the "limited common ele-
ments." These interests are rights of co-ownership. Both own-
ership and co-ownership of immovables are by definition "real
rights" in Louisiana.
2. Mineral Rights: Servitudes, Leases, and Royalties. - The
branch of Louisiana law governing mineral rights has been pre-
dominantly the product of a creative jurisprudence. 3 9 The dis-
covery and production of oil and gas in the state compelled Lou-
isiana courts to adapt the precepts of the Civil Code to new de-
velopments and to supplement them by the enunciation of rules
applicable to the various "mineral rights." The Louisiana legis-
lature failed to adopt an all-inclusive mineral code and limited
itself to piecemeal corrective legislation in connection with par-
ticular issues. Mineral rights in Louisiana may take various
forms and may issue from various transactions, such as "sale,"
"reservation," or "lease.' 40 Sale or reservation of the right to
search for minerals and reduce them to possession is said to
establish a "mineral servitude," while the mineral lease is classi-
fied as a "personal right." The right to share in the proceeds
of production ("royalty") is said to be a sui generis real right
distinguishable from both servitude and lease. These terms will
be discussed separately.
Quite frequently, landowners "sell" the minerals and reserve
title to the land or "reserve" the minerals and transfer title to
the land. At the incipient stage of development of the oil and
gas industries in Louisiana, these transactions were thought of
as "translative" of ownership rights and as creative of a distinct
mineral estate.14 ' Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court follow-
136. See Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovabias in Louisiana and Compara-
tive Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517, 522 (1962).
137. See La. Acts 1962, No. 494, § 2(a).
138. Id. § 2(e).
139. See DAGOGET, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA, Introduction (1949).
140. See Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666(1923)'
(sale) ; Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922) (reservation); Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 Sbo.'526
(1925) (lease).
141. See DeMoss v. Sample, 143 La. 243, 248, 78 So. 482, 484 (1918) ("The
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ing common law authorities had indicated that land ownership
was susceptible of horizontal division and that minerals might
be "owned" in place. 42 But in the landmark case of Frost-John-
son Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs,'43 the Supreme Court declared
emphatically that "oil and gas in place are not subject to abso-
lute ownership as specific things apart from the soil of which
they form part" and that sale or reservation gives merely the
right to search for and reduce to possession all minerals found.
While it is apparent that this decision was prompted by policy
considerations, the court stressed technical reasoning. A land-
owner, the court said, "cannot convey or reserve the ownership
of the oils, gases, and waters therein apart from the land in
which they lie .. .because the owner himself has no absolute
property in such oil, gases, and waters, but only the right to
draw them through the soil and thereby become the owner
of them... the principle being that no one can convey to
ownership doctrine was based on the assumption that oil and
gas were fugacious minerals which, like other fugacious things,
could be owned only after reduced to possession.' 44
It has been argued that this assumption does not conform
with geological data.145 However, doubts as to the validity of
technical reasoning should be divorced from the consideration
of policy grounds. Little argument can be made against the
position of the court that minerals are a component part of
the ground and cannot be conveyed separately from the ground;
this is in conformity with both civilian notions and policy con-
siderations relating to the preservation of simplicity of land
tenures. Thus, assuming that the landowner owns the min-
erals, still dismemberment of his ownership could be precluded
on policy grounds. If the Louisiana Supreme Court insisted on
the non-ownership theory, this was apparently done for two
reasons: to preclude attacks on the constitutionality of conser-
parties have divided the property in what might be called horizontal planes").
142. See Calhoun v. Ardis, 144 La. 311, 314, 80 So. 548, 549 (1919) : "What-
ever doubt may have existed in this state as to the right of an owner of lands, to
dismember the property and vest the ownership of the surface of the soil in one
person and that of the minerals . . . in another person, or retain it in himself,
was definitely set at rest by the decision of this court in the case No. 21433,
De Moss v. Sample, 143 La. 243, 78 So. 482." But cf. Iberville Land Co. v. Texas
Co., 14 La. App. 221, 128 So. 304 (1st Cir. 1930) (horizontal division of mineral
property "a legal impossibility") ; Saunders v. Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 1049,
71 So. 153 (1914) ; DAOGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 5 (1949).
143. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
144. Id. at 863, 91 So. at 245.
145. Id.'at 807-11, 91 So. at 225 (dissenting opinion of Provosty, J.).
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vation statutes 46 and to block forever the recognition of mineral
estates. If the argument of the dissenting Justices that the land-
owner owned the minerals in place were granted, then there
would still be room for discussion and evaluation of the policy
excluding horizontal divisibility of land ownership.
As ownership of minerals in place was excluded, char-
acterization of the "reservation" of minerals as a personal right
seemed to be the most probable alternative under the Civil Code.
But this would afford little protection to landowners reserving
title to minerals or to persons acquiring minerals by sale. Con-
sequently, the court was led to the idea that reservation or sale
of minerals created a real right. This should be a new kind of
real right. It could not be a predial servitude because it was
not established for the benefit of another estate (Civil Code
Article 647). Nor should it be a usufruct because a usufruct is
non-transferable and expires with the death of the usufructuary
(Civil Code Article 606). There was room for doubt, however,
whether the parties to an agreement could create real rights
beyond and apart from those established in the Civil Code, and
particularly "personal" servitudes. Thus, citing French authori-
ties and after having reviewed all relevant articles of the Civil
Code, the Court came to the conclusion that
"[I]n the matter of burdening his lands with some real
obligation in favor of a person and his heirs, there is not
the least doubt that the owner can do so unless some positive
law prohibits it. Now the right to establish a servitude in
favor of a person and his heirs seems to be forbidden by
C.C. art. 646, 709. But, on the other hand, it seems to be
allowed by C.C. arts. 607, 758, 2013. And with these con-
flicting provisions before us we cannot say that the law
clearly prohibits the creation of a servitude upon lands in
favor of a person and his heirs. And hence the intention of
the parties should govern in such matters. '14 7
This mineral servitude in favor of a person and his heirs is
clearly a real right in Louisiana 4 8 governed in part by the code
146. Id. at 836, 91 So. at 235 (dissenting opinion of O'Niell, J.).
147. Id. at 864, 91 So. at 245.
148. See Munn v. Wadley, 192 La. 874, 189 So. 561 (1939) (reservation of
minerals: "a real right") ; Shaw v. Watson, 151 La. 893, 92 So. 375 (1922) (sale
of mineral rights: "a real right," "a servitude upon the land") ; Vincent v. Bullock,
192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) (mineral royalty: "a species of a real right");
Barthold v. Dover, 153 So. 49 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934), rehearing denied, 153 So.
724 (1934) (sale of mineral rights:: "servitude"). The mineral servitude, being an
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provisions applicable to predial servitudes and usufruct and in
part by special legislation and jurisprudence. 49
A lease for the production of minerals may be granted by
the landowner, or, in case a mineral servitude is established,
by the holder of this right.1 5° Mineral leases were treated for
many years under various classifications. I5' In the late twenties
and early thirties, the Louisiana Supreme Court maintained the
view that a mineral lease was "a personal servitude in the nature
of a limited usufruct."' 2 But when the occasion arose, the
Supreme Court announced that a mineral lease had never been
defined to be a true usufruct because it does not attach to an
immovable so as to pass with it.13 In a number of cases, how-
ever, and for several purposes, mineral leases were treated as
servitudes and as real rights., 4
The question concerning the legal nature of mineral leases
was clarified by a landmark case, Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassel,15'
decided in 1936. In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court
repudiated all prior inconsistent cases and declared that mineral
leases were personal contracts rather than servitudes, subject
incorporeal immovable, is not susceptible of being burdened by another servitude.
Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 43 So. 2d 782 (1949).
149. See DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 19-142 (1949). Reserva-
tion of mineral rights is an incorporeal immovable governed, for conflict of laws
purposes, by the lex rei sitae. Munn v. Wadley, 192 La. 874, 189 So. 561 (1939).
150. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 207-24 (1949).
151. See Comment, The Louisiana Mineral Lease as a Contract Creating Real
Rights, 35 TUL. L. REV. 218, 219 (1960).
152. See Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 782, 132 So. 229, 231 (1931)
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 780, 91 So. 207, 216
(1922). See also State ex rel. Bush v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 185 La. 496,
169 So. 523 (1936) ; Federal Land Bank v. Mulhern, 180 La. 627, 157 So. 370
(1934) ; Wiley v. Davis, 164 La. 1090, 115 So. 280 (1928). Cf. United Gas Pub-
lic Service Co. v. Barrett, 179 So. 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938) (mineral lease:
"a rent charge" and "a real obligation") ; Pan American Production Co. v. United
Land Co., 96 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1938) (mineral lease: a "real obligation").
153. See Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931); Wilkins v.
Nelson, 155 La. 807, 99 So. 607 (1924). Cf. Wilkins v. Nelson, 161 La. 437, 108
So. 875 (1926).
154. See Hamilton v. Glassel, 57 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1932). Cf. Noble v.
Plouf, 154 La. 429, 97 So. 599 (1923) (transfer of lease subject to the rules gov-
erning sale of immovable property). See also Arent v. Hunter, 171 La. 1059, 133
So. 157 (1931); Wiley v. Davis, 164 La. 1090, 115 So. 280 (1928). Cf. State
ex ret. Bush v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 185 La. 496, 498, 169 So. 523, 524
(1936) : "The fact that an oil and gas lease is one of servitude is no longer a
debatable question in this state."
155. 186 La. 190, 198, 171 So. 846, 849 (1936) : "The lessee in the usual min-
eral and oil lease based upon cash or royalty consideration, or both, merely obtains
an obligatory or personal right but not a real right - a jus in re." See also Fergu-
son v. Britt, 191 La. 371, 185 So. 287 (1938) ; Tomlison v. Thurmon, 189 La.
959, 181 So. 458 (1938) ; Tyson v. Spearman, 190 La. 871, 183 So. 201 (1938)
Posey v. Fargo, 187 La. 122, 174 So. 175 (1937).
1963]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIII
to the code provisions governing ordinary leases. In response
to this decision, the Louisiana legislature passed Act 205 of
1938, defining and classifying mineral leases as real rights.15 6
When the act was attacked as involving a retroactive change in
substantive mineral law, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld
its constitutionality on the ground that the purpose of the act
was merely to give a procedural remedy. 157 The act was amended
in 1950 to include a declaration that "it shall be considered as
substantive as well as procedural."' 58 It would seem that the
purpose of the amendment was to classify mineral leases as
real rights for all purposes. The Supreme Court, however, has
indicated that this amendment did not convert mineral leases
from personal contracts into real rights. The nature of the
mineral leases as personal contracts remained unaffected, but
these leases are considered as real rights so that lessees may
benefit from the application of real property laws. As was stated
emphatically in Reagan v. Murphy,15 9 and quoted with approval
in Harwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black,10 "the right of a lessee
is not a real right, i.e. a jus in re. In other words, the lessee
does not hold one of the elements of property in the thing. His
right is a jus ad rem, a right upon the thing." But Article 3664
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure declares with equal
156. La. Acts 1938, No. 205, LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950) ; Hebert & Lazarus,
The Louisiana Legislation of 1938, 1 LA. L. REV. 80, 100 (1938) ; Moses, A Short
History of the Development of the Statutory Definition and Classification of an
Oil, Gas, and Mineral Lease as a Real Right, 13 TuL. L. REV. 416 (1939).
157. See Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940). In most
subsequent cases, the courts, though recognizing the lessee's rights as being "real,"
consistently held that Act 205 did not confer new substantive rights but was
merely "remedial and procedural" in character. See Wier v. Grubb, 215 La. 967,
41 So. 2d 846 (1949) ; Allison v. Maroun, 193 La. 286, 190 So. 408 (1939) ; Payne
v. Walmsley, 185 So. 88 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938). Thus, in spite of the 1938
enactment, mineral leases continued to be treated as contracts creating only per-
sonal obligations governed by the code articles on lease. See Arnold v. Sun Oil
Co., 218 La. 50, 46 So. 2d 369 (1950) (mineral lease not protected by the recorda-
tion statutes). The case was overruled by legislative action. See La. Acts 1950,
No. 7, LA. R.S. 9:2721-24 (1950). See also Coyle v. North Am. Oil Consol., 201
La. 99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942) (cancellation of lease) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v.
Reese, 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940) (partition). The last case was overruled
by the amendment of Article 741 of the Civil Code.
158. La. Acts 1950, No. 6, LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950). See also LA. CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3664 (1960).
159. 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958). See also Calhoun v. Gulf Refining
Co., 235 La. 494, 507, 104 So. 2d 547, 551 (1958) : "This Court, in dealing with
the ordinary oil and gas lease, has applied the articles of the Code applicable to
leases . . . .The lessee under a lease contract does not obtain a real right in the
sense of absolute dominion, and a lease is not one of those real obligations which
attach as a burden to the land, as does a servitude; in other words, a lease is not
a jus in re, but a jus ad rem, a right upon the thing."
160. 240 La. 641, 124 So. 2d 764 (1960). See also Tinsley v. Seismic Explora-
tions, Inc., 239 La. 23, 117 So. 2d 897 (1960).
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emphasis that "a mineral lessee or sublessee ... is the owner of
a real right."'" This article was intended, according to an
accompanying comment by the redactors of the Code, "to show
a clear and unmistakable legislative intent, despite any of the
language of the majority opinion in Reagan v. Murphy ... to
permit the enforcement of any of the rights enumerated in the
above articles by the actions recognized in this Chapter."'1 2
Thus, though personal contracts in nature, mineral leases
always function as real rights in connection with issues of
procedure'63 and in connection with issues of substantive law
in a number of situations specified by jurisprudence and legis-
lation. Indicatively, the mineral lease functions as a real right
in connection with the problem of reliance on public records ;164
transfer of mineral leases must be made by written instrument
which, in order to affect interests of third parties, must be
recorded;165 mineral leases are subject to mortgage as immov-
able property;166 and, in a partition by licitation of an im-
movable, the rights of the lessee are in effect equivalent to
real rights. 67 On the other hand, a mineral lessee enjoys less
than full proprietary protection in case of geophysical tres-
pass,8 8 has no standing to claim a right of passage over private
roads as owner of an estate, 69 and his lease may not be lost
161. See LA. CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE art. 3664 (1960). In spite of the broad
language of this article, there is still room for doubt that the mineral lessee will
enjoy in Louisiana the full protection accorded by the real actions. See Comment,
The Louisiana Mineral Lease as a Contract Creating Real Rights, 35 TUL. L. REV.
218, 229 (1960).
162. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3664 (1960), Comment (a).
163. Cf. note 137 supra; Alison v. Wideman, 210 La. 314, 26 So. 2d 826 (1946)
(petitory action) ; Payne v. Walmsley, 185 So. 88 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938)
(venue).
164. See LA. R.S. 9:2721-24 (1950) ; Serio v. Chadwick, 66 So. 2d 9 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1953).
165. Davidson v. Midstates Oil Corp., 211 La. 882, 31 So. 2d 7 (1947) ; Ar-
kansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. R. 0. Roy & Co., 196 La. 121, 198 So. 768 (1940)
(leases incorporeal immovable property within the meaning of Article 471 of the
Civil Code for purposes of formalities of transfer).166. See La. Acts 1910, No. 232, LA. R.S. 30:109 (1950); La. Acts 1938,
No. 96, LA. R.S. 9:5101 (1950) ; Hebert & Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation
of 1988, Mortgage of Mineral Rights, 1 LA. L. REV. 80 (1938).
167. See LA. CIL CODE art. 741 (1870) as amended by La. Acts 1940, No.
336, and La. Acts 1950, No. 521; Nabors, Report of the Mineral Law Commit-
tee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, 26 TUL. L. REV. 172, 180 (1952).
168. See Tinsley v. Seismic Explorations, Inc., 239 La. 23, 117 So. 2d 897
(1960). But the owner of a mineral servitude enjoys full proprietary protection.
See Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So. 2d 457 (1948). It would
seem that the Tinsley case is overruled by Article 3664 of the Code of Civil Pro-'
cedure.
. 169.:See 'Harwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So. 2d 764
(1960).
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by the ten-year prescription of non-use which applies to real
rights.7 0 The mineral lease, therefore, should necessarily be
classified as a hybrid contract governed in part by the Code
provisions on lease, sale, or servitudes, and in part by special
legislation and rules of judge-made law."7
The involved structure of mineral rights in Louisiana proved
sufficiently resilient in 1939 to accommodate a newcomer, a
brand new "real right' 17 2 called mineral royalty'78 for lack of
a better descriptive term. "Royalty" is a polysemantic word
which in the framework of concrete legal relationships may
designate rights of variable content. Ordinarily, however, ab-
straction is made of two basic concepts, "rent royalty" and
"mineral royalty." The rent royalty forms part of the con-
sideration for a lease and, analytically, appears to be a right
partaking of the nature of the lease complex.7 4 The mineral
royalty, on the other hand, has evolved as a distinct right to
a portion of minerals actually produced or their proceeds. 175 This
right "to share in the production" 76 has been designated by the
courts as "a species of a real right,'1 77 "a real obligation,' 7 8
170. See Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958). The reason-
ing of the Reagan case has been disapproved by the legislature, at least insofar,
as it may bear on real actions. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3664
(1960), Comment (a). Cf. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Ayer Timber Co., 131
So. 2d 635 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) (leases with option to purchase; prescrip-
tion of non-use starts running from the date of actual purchase rather than from
the date of lease). Upon extinction of the mineral servitude, the mineral rights
revert to the present owner of the land. Accordingly, leases granted by the holder
of the servitude terminate upon extinction of the servitude. Calhoun v. Gulf Re-
fining Co., 235 La. 494, 104 So. 2d 547 (1958).
171. See Comment, The Louisiana Mineral Lease as a Contract Creating Real
Rights, 35 TuL. L. REV. 218 (1960).
172. See Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
173. The mineral royalty is also known as "royalty properly-so-called," "royalty
per se," "landowner's royalty," and plainly as "royalty." See DAGGETT, MINERAL
RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 17, 249 (1949).
174. The rent royalty is also known as "lease royalty." See DAGGETT, id. at
250.
175. In contrast to the rent royalty, the mineral royalty "[does] not constitute
a part of the consideration due by the lessee under a specific lease." Gulf Refin-
ing Co. v. Hunter Co., 231 La. 1002, 1013, 93 So. 2d 537, 541 (1957).
176. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 1019, 117
So. 2d 575, 577 (1960).
177. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939). See also Crown Central
Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575 (1960) ; Union Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96 (1959) (second rehearing);
Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949) ; Humble Oil &
Refiniing Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So. 2d 182 (1947).
178. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) (a real obligation in
favor of the plaintiffs, their heirs or assigns). See also Crown Central Petroleum
Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575 (1960) ; St. Martin Land Co. v.
Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947) ; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So. 2d 182 (1947) (2d rehearing) ; United Gas Public
Service Co. v. Barrett, 179 So. 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
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"a conditional obligation,"'1 79  "an appendage of a mineral
right,"'8 and as a "jus ad rem."'181 Some of these designations
are obviously contradictory and mutually exclusive while others
are compatible and complementary. 182 Leaving aside names given
to the mineral royalty and concentrating on its functional char-
acteristics, a well-defined though sketchy picture may be drawn,
The mineral royalty may be carved out of the land owner-
ship directly (in case mineral rights are not yet segregated from
the land ownership) or from outstanding mineral rights by
means of "reservation" or "sale." 1 3 A recorded mineral royalty
is an "absolute" right that can be asserted against anyone and
not merely a contractual arrangement, an obligation, existing
between the original parties to the transaction. 184 The royalty
right is freely assignable by its holder; correlative duties of
the holder of mineral rights are assignable, as a matter of law,
along with the mineral rights. Thus, any successor to the min-
erals charged with a royalty will be under an obligation to pay
179. Union Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96 (1959)
(2d rehearing). See also LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 230 La. 299,
88 So. 2d 377 (1956) ; St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d
169 (1947).
180. Union Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96 (1959)
(2d rehearing). See also Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 526, 41
So. 2d 73, 75 (1949) ("an appendage of the right of the mineral owner, and de-
pends upon the continued existence of the right to which it is an appendage"). It
has been also stated that "a mineral right is necessarily superior to a royalty
right." Ibid.
181. Concurring opinion by Hamiter, J., in St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney,
212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947). The mineral royalty has also been described as
"sale of a hope." Ibid.
182. For example, in the light of traditional classification and accepted mean-
ing of the words, a real right cannot be simultaneously a conditional obligation
nor can a jus in re be also a jus ad rem. Such loose use of traditional terminology
leads to confusion of ideas and is meaningless. On the other hand, a real right
may well be an appendage of a mineral right and a real obligation may also be
conditional. Finally, real right and real obligation are quite frequently synonymous
terms, though accurate terminology ought to reserve the term "real right" to de-
scribe the active side, and "real obligation" the passive side, of the same relation-
ship.
183. See Union Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96
(1959) (sale) Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Sanders, 224 La. 448, 69 So. 745 (1954)
(reservation); St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169
(1947) (sale) Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) (reservation).
184. Cf. text at note 55 supra; United Gas Public Service Co. v. Barrett, 179
So. 506, 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938) : "The transfer of a portion of the rents to
become due by the lessee to the law firm was a rent charge imposed upon an im-
movable property and when it was recorded . . . it was notice to the public and
affected third persons, and any purchaser of mineral rights in and under the land
affected thereby subsequent thereto, took them subject to the recorded contract of
transfer." In the meanwhile, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the view that
the mineral royalty is a "rent charge" (Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So.
35 (1939)), but the rest of the quotation describes accurately the effect of recorda-
tion.
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proceeds subsequently accruing. The mineral royalty differs
from both the mineral servitude and the mineral lease in that
it is "passive" and does not include the right to search for min-
erals.'5 5 But, as in the case of both mineral servitude and lease,
it seems to be an open question whether the holder of the mineral
rights has a correlative fiduciary duty to exercise reasonable
care with the view to securing production. 1'
Since participation in the proceeds of minerals depends on
actual production, it is commonly stated that the mineral royalty
is an obligation subject to a suspensive condition. 18 7 This judicial
rationalization has caused some confusion, for it is well settled
that, unless production is secured, the mineral royalty is extin-
guished by the lapse of a ten-year prescriptive period.'88 The
designation of the mineral royalty as a conditional obligation
is obviously inconsistent with the application of a ten-year
(liberative) prescription which starts to run as soon as the
185. Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949). See
also Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575
(1960).
186. Cf. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 673, 33 So. 2d
182, 191-92 (1947) (rehearing) : "Had a third person sought to obtain from Guil-
lory . . . a lease, the granting of it, of course depended on his will. . . . In the
usual mineral royalty deed the purchaser does not receive from the landowner an
obligation to drill or to grant a lease for exploitation purposes." Cf. concurring
opinion by Hamiter, J., in St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 626, 33
So. 2d 169, 175 (1947) : "When royalty is sold, as the purchaser knows, the land-
owner does not obligate himself either to develop the land or to lease to a third
person for exploration purposes."
187. See St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 615, 33 So. 2d 169,
172 (1947) ("not a servitude but a conditional obligation, depending on an un-
certain event, that prescribes in ten years if the event did not happen prior there-
to"). See also Union Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96
(1959) ; LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 230 La. 299, 88 So. 2d 377 (1956).
188. See Gulf Refining Co. v. Hunter Co., 231 La. 1002, 1013, 93 So. 2d 537,
541 (1957) : "The ten year prescriptive period began to run on the day the inter-
est was so reserved or acquired rather than at the time production was obtained."
Civil law doctrine and the Louisiana Civil Code distinguish clearly between libera-
tive prescription which applies to actions for the enforcement of rights and pre-
scription for non-use which applies to real rights other than full ownership. Which
prescription applies to the mineral royalty "was not answered in the Vincent case,
although a prescription of ten years was there applied." Hamiter, J., concurring
opinion in St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 627, 33 So. 2d 169, 176
(1947). Nor was this question answered in subsequent cases which merely indi-
cated that the applicable prescription was one liberandi causa. Cf. Union Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96 (1959) and cases cited; Gulf
Refining Co. v. Hunter Co., 231 La. 1002, 93 So. 2d 537 (1957) where the court
mentioned Articles 3528, 3529, 3549, 3544, and 3546 of the Civil Code. Justice
Hamiter concluded in his concurring opinion in St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney,
212 La. 605, 627, 33 So. 2d 169, 176 (1.947) that "a mineral royalty, although a
real right . . . is governed by Article 3544 which provides for the prescribing of
a personal action by ten years." It is submitted, however, that the prescription
applicable to mineral royalty is the prescription for non-use established in Article
3546 of the Civil Code. This solution is compatible with the classification of the
mineral royalty as a real right. Cf. text at note 194 infra.
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royalty is constituted. If the mineral royalty were a conditional
obligation, liberative prescription ought to start running only
upon fulfillment of the condition. 89 Consistent analysis may
be achieved only on the basis of the traditional civilian distinc-
tion betwen rights and claims deriving from rights.19 In this
light it is apparent that the mineral royalty is an unconditional
right, while claims deriving therefrom are subject to a suspen-
sive condition.' 91 However, though an unconditional right, the
mineral royalty is subject to a ten-year prescription for non-use
(rather than liberative prescription) by analogy to other real
rights. 92 This prescription might be regarded as a resolutory
condition attached by the law to real rights other than full
ownership.
The ten-year precriptive period cannot be waived in advance
nor can a lengthier period be stipulated; but a running pre-
scription can be interrupted by acknowledgment.'9 In all cases
prescription is interrupted by productionIN in the tract subject
189. Cf. argument by counsel in Gulf Refining Co. v. Hunter Co., 231 La.
1002, 93 So. 2d 537 (1957) ; concurring opinion by Hamiter, J., in St. Martin
Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 622, 33 So. 2d 169, 174 (1947) : "But I do not
agree with the conclusion in the Vincent case that a mineral royalty is an obliga-
tion dependent on a suspensive condition within the meaning and intendment of
Civil Code, Articles 2013, 2021 and 2038. If it were such an obligation, the opera-
tion of the contract, according to the very provisions of those articles, would be
suspended until the occurrence of the event upon which it is conditioned (the pro-
duction of minerals) ; and, hence, the applicable liberative prescription would com-
mence to run only from that time."
190. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINEE TEIL DES B1RGERLICHEN
RzcETS 960-68 (1955).
191. Cf. concurring opinion by Hamiter, J., in St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney,
212 La. 605, 627, 33 So. 2d 169, 176 (1947) : "And since there is an unconditional,
completed sale on the signing of the deed, prescription liberandi causa necessarily
commences to run at that time."
192. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 790, 3546 (1870). Cf. note 188 supra.
193. See Union Sulphur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 644, 33 So. 2d 178, 182
(1947) : "To interrupt the current of that prescription the mere acknowledgment
of the existence of the right is insufficient. There must appear also an intention
of the person making the acknowledgment that the accruing prescription be inter-
rupted." See also Crown Central Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112
So. 2d 96 (1959) ; Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956).
194. Question has arisen as to what constitutes production. The law today is
settled that production means successful drilling operations, i.e., production of
minerals in paying quantities. Drilling which, though earlier commenced, proves
successful after the lapse of ten years does not fulfill the suspensive condition.
But the condition is fulfilled even where the minerals produced are not presently
marketable. See LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 230 La. 299, 88 So. 2d 377
(1956) ; Union Oil Co. of California v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956) ;
Union Sulphur Co. v. Andrau, 217 La. 662, 47 So. 2d 38 (1950) ; Union Sulphur
Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 33 So. 2d 178 (1947) ; St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinck-
ney, 212 La. 605, 33 So. 2d 169 (1947). Production from one of the tracts is not
production from the other non-contiguous tracts. Continental Oil Co. v. Landry,
215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949). Depending on the particular agreement, produc-
tion from one sand may not fulfill the condition as to possible exploitation from
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to the mineral royalty or in adjacent tracts according to a valid
unitization agreement.19 5 Depending on the terms of the con-
tract by which the mineral royalty is constituted, unitization
of only part of the tract subject to the royalty may or may not
interrupt the running of the prescription as to the entire tract.1'
The minority or other legal disability of the holder of the min-
eral royalty does not suspend the prescription.
19 7
The suspensive condition attached to claims deriving from
a mineral royalty ordinarily must be fulfilled within ten years
from the date in which the royalty is constituted. 98 Thus, if
there is no production from the tract of land for which the
royalty is granted or from adjacent tracts in accordance with
a valid unitization agreement, the suspensive condition fails.
This rule is seemingly contrary to Article 2038 of the Civil Code,
which provides that if there be no time fixed the conditions
may be fulfilled at any future time.199 The contradiction is only
apparent; the failure of the condition is merely the necessary
consequence of the extinction of the right by the running of
the prescriptive period. Thus, the interrelation between the
ten-year prescriptive period applicable to the royalty right and
the suspensive condition attached to the claim for a share in the
proceeds ought to be noted. Causes interrupting prescription
constitute at the same time fulfillment of the suspensive condi-
tion; completion of the prescription constitutes failure of the
suspensive condition.
It has been stated that a prescribed mineral royalty "passes
out of the picture ' '200 and that there is no reversionary interest.
other sands. See Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So. 2d 73 (1949).
"Production" is also relevant for the fulfillment of the suspensive condition. See
text at note 198 infra.195. See Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d
575 (1960) ; Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956).
196. See Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 1030, 117
So. 2d 575, 581 (1960). The question was "whether a voluntary conventional
unitization agreement divided royalty rights into two segments, and [the court]
held that those rights were not divided by the agreement."
197. See LA. R.S. 9:5805 (1950).
198. See Union Sulphur Co. v. Andrau, 217 La. 662, 670, 47 So. 2d 38, 41
(1957) : "If the event does not happen within ten years the right to share in the
production is lost." See also LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 230 La. 299,
88 So.2d 377 (1956).
199. See LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2038 (1870). Cf. Gulf Refining Co. v. Hunter
Co., 231 La. 1002, 1012, 93 So. 2d 537, 540 (1957) : "True the contract did not
designate a time within which the event must happen, nevertheless, that time is
limited by law and 'the condition is considered as broken, when the time [10
years] has expired without the event having taken place.' "
200. Arkansas Fuel Co. v. Sanders, 224 La. 448, 450, 69 So. 2d 745, 746
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Accordingly, contracts reserving a reversionary interest are
without object. Alternatively, it has been said that reservation
of a reversionary interest would be contrary to the public policy
of the state.20 1 This, in functional terms, means that a pre-
scribed mineral royalty benefits the holder of the mineral rights
rather than the present owner of the land. The mineral royalty
thus appears to be a dismemberment of, and a charge on, the
mineral rights.
According to legislative declaration, the mineral royalty in
Louisiana ought to be classified as an incorporeal immovable
20 2
protected by the real actions.2 3 This classification, however,
does not render applicable to the mineral royalty the thirty-year
prescriptive period which applies to real actions.20 4 Since the
primary life span of the mineral royalty is limited and the right
itself is extinguished after the lapse of ten years without pro-
duction, real actions for the protection of a non-existing right
would be without object.
The foregoing analysis shows that the concept of the mineral
royalty has not as yet been fully developed and that there is
still room for speculation as to some specific characteristics
and attributes of the new right. So far the courts have had
the opportunity to settle only a number of concrete questions
and further refinement of the concept is to be expected. In the
light of the present jurisprudence, the mineral royalty ought
to be classified as a sui generis real right. It differs from the
traditional real rights in that, in the last analysis, it is not a
right in corporeal property but a charge on an incorporeal im-
movable attached to land - the mineral right. It is a real right
in the sense that it is an exclusive patrimonial right which, if
recorded, may be asserted during its lifetime against the world.
S. Timber Estates. - According to Article 465(1) of the
Louisiana Civil Code "trees before they are cut down" are im-
movables by their nature "and are considered as part of the
(1954) : "When the royalty right prescribed it passed out of the picture. There
was nothing to revert to any one. The parties are in the same position as though
no royalty right had ever existed. It was merely a conditional obligation depend-
ing on an uncertain event which prescribed in ten years because the event did not
occur."
201. See Union Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 112 So. 2d 96
(1959) (2d rehearing). Currier & Weiss, The Broussard Case and Prescription
of Mineral Royalty, 34 TUL. L. REV. 685 (1960).
202. See LA. R.S. 9:1005 (1950).
203. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3664 (1960).
204. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3548 (1870).
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land to which they are attached." This provision had been cor-
rectly interpreted by Louisiana courts - in the light of its
sources and with reference to French jurisprudence and doc-
trine - to mean that standing timber was a component part of
the soil.2 0 5 As in France, however, standing timber was held
to be susceptible of "mobilization by anticipation," that is, the
landowner could sell standing timber as a future movable. 206
The purchaser's right was declared to be "ownership" of a
movable, governed by all the rules applicable to movable prop-
erty.207
The legal status of standing timber was altered in Louisiana
by Act 188 of 1904. This act provided that "standing timber
shall remain an immovable, and be subject to all the laws rela-
tive to immovables, even when separated in ownership from the
land on which it stands. '208 There has been some speculation as
to the reasons which prompted this "sweeping" enactment.2
9
Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the Louisiana
legislature impressed with the relative value of standing timber
which by far exceeded the value of land stripped of its timber,
sought to afford maximum protection to this valuable asset.
Application of the laws governing immovable property would
obviously enhance security of title: transfer should be subject
to the requirements of written document and recordation, and
the holder of timber rights would be able to evoke application
of the "real actions" for the protection of his right. The statute
affects the legal status of standing timber only if this is owned
205. See Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Compara-
tive Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517, 519 (1962) ; note 211 infra. On the status of tim-
ber as immovable property, see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the 1948-1949 Term-- Property, 10 LA. L. REV. 175, 176 (1950); Comment,
The Sale of Standing Timber in Louisiana, 20 TUL. L. REV. 428 (1946) ; Note,
15 TUL. L. REV. 475 (1941).
206. See Lumber Co. v. Sheriff, 106 La. 414, 418, 30 So. 902 (1901). See
also Williams Cypress Co. v. Dugas, 7 La. App. 368 (1st Cir. 1928).
207. See note 206 supra. See also Woodruff v. Roberts, 4 La. Ann. 127 (1849)
(wood cut and corded and separated from the land when sold, is movable, and does
not pass to the purchaser). Cf. Voisin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 131 La.
775, 60 So. 241 (1913) ; Eastman v. Harris, 4 La. Ann. 193 (1849) (conversion
of cut timber).
208. See La. Acts 1904, No. 188, LA. R.S. 9:1103 (1950) : the act does not
have retroactive effect. Williams Cypress Co. v. Dugas, 7 La. App. 368 (1st
Cir. 1928).
209. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1965 Term-
Particular Contracts, 16 LA. L. REV. 242, 244 (1956). See also Williams Cypress
Co. v. Dugas, 7 La. App. 368, 374 (1st Cir. 1928) ("The act of 1904 had no
other effect upon the status of standing timber . . . except to declare it an im-
movable, where before that it might have been argued that it was a movable").
Cf. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 156 (1925).
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separately. If the landowner is also the holder of the timber
rights, standing timber continues to be governed by Article
465(1) of the Civil Code.210  In these circumstances standing
timber is still a component part of the soil and passes to the
purchaser of the land even in the absence of specific mention.2 1'
Further, the statute does not affect the legal status of felled
timber which should be classified as movable property, whether
belonging to the owner of the land or to a purchaser. 212
Act 188 of 1904 permits horizontal division of land owner-
ship. Thus the sale or reservation of standing timber in Louisi-
ana has the effect of creating two separate and distinct im-
movables: the timber and the ground.218 Where this happens,
210. Cf. Buckner-Harmon Wood Contractor v. Norris, 231 La. 437, 91 So. 2d
594 (1957).
211. See Wollums v. Hewitt, 142 La. 597, 77 So. 295 (1918). Of. Cousins v.
Cusachs, 6 La. App. 837 (1st Cir. 1927). In these cases standing timber was
termed an "accessory" of the land. Accurate terminology should be : "component
part" of the land. See Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the Law of Things, 22 LA. L.
RzV. 756, 783 (1962).
212. See Gillespie v. W. A. Ransom Lumber Co., 132 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. La.
1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1956). But cf. Livaudais v. Williams Lumber
Co., 34 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948). In that case, defendant, the pur-
chaser of timber, had a period of three years to remove it from the land. More
than a year after expiration of this period, and while the land was in the hands
of a new owner, the purchaser removed timber which had been cut prior to the
expiration of the removal period. An action of trespass followed. Counsel for the
defendant argued that felled timber was a movable, and, therefore, had not been
transferred to and was not owned by the present landowner. The court held for
the plaintiff on two grounds: (1) cut timber is an immovable, citing LA. R.S.
9:1103 (1950) ; and (2) after expiration of the removal period title to the timber
vested in the present landowner. The second ground should be sufficient for the
disposition of the case. The first ground does not seem to be well taken: the
statute classifies as an immovable standing timber separated in ownership of the
ground. Cut timber is always a movable. This, however, does not necessarily mean
that cut timber is owned by the grantee of the timber estate after expiration of
the period for removal. When the parties stipulate a period for removal, ordinarily,
they mean removal of all timber whether standing or cut. Further, although cut
timber is no longer a "component part" of the ground, it may be owned by the
present landowner: cut timber, and the reversionary interest, may validly be re-
garded as "accessories" of the title to the land.
213. See Stanga v. Lake Superior Piling Co., 214 La. 237, 242, 36 So. 2d 778,
779 (1948) : "The effect of the timber deed . . . was the creation in favor of
defendant of an estate, separate and apart from the land, consisting of all of the
then merchantable pine timber." See also Willetts Wood Products Co. v. Con-
cordia Land & Timber Co., 169 La. 240, 124 So. 841 (1929) (reservation) ; Brown
v. Hodge-Hunt Lumber Co., 162 La. 635, 110 So. 886 (1927) (reservation). The
separate estate in standing timber is created only after "the ownership therein
has been separated from the land." Buchner-Harmon Wood Contractor v. Norris,
231 La. 437, 443, 91 So. 2d 594, 596 (1956). Separation of ownership "may be
effected either by conveyance or consent, express or implied, of the landowner."
Ibid. Cf. Willetts Wood Products Co. v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 169 La.
240, 242, 124 So. 841 (1929) (mortgage of land, with reservation of standing
timber, and foreclosure sale by the mortgagee: the court held that "there were
created two separate estates as perfectly and completely as if defendant had made
a conventional sale of the land and reserved to itself the timber"). Apparently,
a timber estate cannot be acquired by a long-term acquisitive prescription because
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timber is no longer regarded as a component part of the ground
and a sale of the land does not carry title to the timber.214 It is
a different question when the landowner commits himself to
convey both land and timber by general warranty deed. In this
case, the landowner will be held liable on his warranty. 215 The
act classifies the interest of the purchaser of timber as an "im-
movable," and Louisiana courts have given full effect to the
obvious legislative intent. Accordingly, the interest of the pur-
chaser if recorded may be asserted against the world, must be
conveyed as an immovable, and may be protected by the posses-
sory and real actions. 216 The sale, being one of an immovable,
may be attacked for lesion beyond moiety217 and may be subject
to action for diminution of the price.
218
it is questionable whether timber not segregated from the land may become the
object of an independent possession. But land with its unsegregated timber may
be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Ordinarily, in such case the question is
what constitutes possession of timber lands. See Boudreaux v. Olin Industries,
232 La. 405, 94 So. 2d 417 (1957) (10 years' acquisitive prescription; civil and
corporeal possession consisting mostly of timber exploitation). See also Mantel v.
Hunt, 195 La. 201, 197 So. 402 (1940) (cutting timber is sufficient possession).
Cf. Harril v. Pitts, 194 La. 123, 193 So. 562 (1940) ; Williams Cypress Co. v.
Dugas, 7 La. App. 368 (1st Cir. 1928) (20 years' possession of land; timber
included). However, where the timber is already separated from the land, pos-
session of the land does not constitute possession of the timber estate; hence,
although title to the land may be acquired by acquisitive prescription, this title
does not necessarily carry title to the timber. See Green v. Longville Lumber Co.,
147 La. 576, 85 So. 596 (1920) ; Gray v. Edgar Lumber Co., 138 La. 906, 910,
70 So. 877, 878 (1916) (held, possession of land did not carry possession of timber.
"The segregation of the timber from the land destroyed its character as an acces-
sory, and converted it into a separate immovable"). Cf. Bagents v. Crowell Long
Leaf Lumber Co., 20 So. 2d 641, 643 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) (Gray case dis-
tinguished: plaintiff's possession by means of an enclosure extended "to the timber
situated on it notwithstanding the creation of the separate timber estate and the
alleged possession of that estate by the defendant").
214. Cf. Brown v. Hodge-Hunt Lumber Co., 162 La. 635, 110 So. 886 (1927)
(tax sale; when timber is segregated from land ownership separate tax assessment
is necessary) ; Gray v. Edgar Lumber Co., 138 La. 906, 70 So. 877 (1916). See
also Woodruff v. Roberts, 4 La. Ann. 127 (1849).
215. See Young v. Sartor, 152 La. 1064, 95 So. 223 (1923). Cf. Bodcaw Lum-
ber Co. v. Clifton Heirs, 169 La. 759, 126 So. 52 (1930) ; Mower v. Richardson,
124 La. 130, 49 So. 1003 (1909).
216. See Ranger Land Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 224 La. 153, 68
So. 2d 907 (1953) (timber "real estate" within the meaning of the Louisiana Real
Estate Act, LA. R.S. 37:1431-1459, 37:1447 (1950)) ; Gray v. Edgar Lumber Co.,
138 La. 906, 70 So. 877 (1916) ; Hill v. Richey, 225 La. 994, 74 So. 2d 190
(1954) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term-Real
Actions, 15 LA. L. REV. 399, 400 (1955) ; Bagents v. Crowell Long Leaf Lumber
Co., 20 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945). Also the sale of a specified number
of trees is sale of immovable property. Martin Timber Co. v. Jean Lumber Co.,
227 La. 894, 80 So. 2d 855 (1955).
217. See Smith v. Hluie-liodge Lumber Co., 129 La. 28, 55 So. 698 (1911)
Smith v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co., 123 La. 959, 49 So. 655 (1909) ; Hydge v.
Barron, 125 La. 227, 51 So. 126 (1910).
218. Martin Timber Co. v. Jean Lumber Co., 227 La. 894, 80 So. 2d 855
(1955) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1964-1955 Term -
Particular Contracts, 16 LA. L. REV. 242, 244 (1956).
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Contracts establishing timber rights have been consistently
classified by Louisiana courts as "sales," notwithstanding asser-
tions by interested parties that creation of a servitude was
intended.219 These decisions, based on interpretation of obscure
contractual provisions, should not be taken to exclude the pos-
sibility of creating a timber servitude by clear language. A
timber servitude established for the benefit of an estate would
be a predial servitude under the Civil Code 220 and one estab-
lished for the benefit of a person would be either usufruct or
a personal servitude similar to the mineral servitude in nature.22 1
Timber rights could, presumably, be also established by lease222
or license.22 3  But apparently these potential forms of timber
exploitation have not been utilized in Louisiana. Outright sale
of standing timber is the prevailing form of exploitation, a form
which proved quite flexible to satisfy the needs of a growing
timber industry.
The juridical nature of the timber estate created by sale
or reservation has not been fully explored. Language in numer-
ous Louisiana decisions indicates that it is an estate separate
and distinct from the ownership of the land, immovable by
legislative fiat.224 Statutory and judicial language have desig-
nated this estate as "ownership '225 - a right of ownership in
an immovable which is destined to become movable. But the
219. See Stanga v. Lake Superior Piling Co., 214 La. 237, 36 So. 2d 778
(1948) ; Cooley v. Meridian Lumber Co., 195 La. 631, 197 So. 255 (1940) ; Kava-
naugh v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 149 La. 972, 90 So. 275 (1921) ; Simmons v.
Tremont Lumber Co., 144 La. 719, 81 So. 263 (1919). However, the right to con-
struct a tramway for the removal of timber is a servitude accessory to the right
of removal. Prescription of the servitude runs concurrently with the prescription
of timber rights. Kavanaugh v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., supra.
220. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 646-48, 709-10 (1870).
221. Usufruct as a method of timber exploitation is clearly available under the
Louisiana Civil Code. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 646, § 2, 648, § 2 (1870). Creation
of a personal servitude in favor of the grantee and his heirs ought to be available
by reference to Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So.
207 (1922), applied by analogy, Cf. notes 143-147 supra.
222. Cf. Cooley v. Meridian Lumber Co., 195 La. 631, 197 So. 255 (1940) (the
court indicating the possibility of exploitation by means of a lease).
223. Cf. W. B. Thompson & Co. v. Union Sawmill Co., 121 La. 318, 46 So. 431
(1908) (license to cut timber invalid for want of consideration) ; Blackshear v.
Hood, 120 La. 966, 45 So. 957 (1908) (license to cut timber invalid for want
of mutuality : potestative condition).
224. See Bagents v. Crowell Long Leaf Lumber Co., 20 So. 2d 641, 642 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1945) : "The principal contention made by the defendant rests upon
what is more or less a fiction in the law that by the sale of the timber from off a
certain tract of land there are created what has been held to be two separate and
distinct estates .... This separate tenure of different estates is nowhere provided
for in our Civil Code .... It finds its basis only in the statutory law."
225. See LA. R.S. 9:1103 (1950) ; Willetts v. Wood Products Co. v. Concordia
Land.& Title Co., 169 La. 240, 124 So. 841 (1929).
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timber estate is neither perpetual nor of equal rank and dignity
with land ownership.228  Ordinarily, the parties fix a period
of time within which the timber must be removed from the
land. Where no time limit is fixed, the landowner may apply
to the courts to set a time limit for removal.2 27 If the landowner
remains passive, the right of the purchaser is not lost by the
ten-year prescription of non-use.22s Once exercised, the right of
the purchaser terminates unless provision is made for continuous
exploitation. 2 9 The time limit for removal may be a long period,
226. See Willetts Wood Products Co. v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 169
La. 240, 242, 124 So. 841 (1929) : "The further contention is made that, when
separated in ownership from the land on which it stands, the timber becomes an
immovable possessing equal rank and dignity with the land . . . .The contention
amounts to a legal heresy, and is contrary to numerous decisions of this court."
A timber estate, segregated from the land ownership, is susceptible of partition by
licitation. However, where the timber is not fully segregated from the land owner-
ship, partition by licitation of the timber estate is not available. Buckner-Harmon
Wood Contractor v. Norris, 231 La. 437, 91 So. 2d 594 (1956). In this case, an
undivided 10/11 of the timber on a tract of land had been segregated in ownership
from the land and belonged to one group of persons, while the remaining 1/11 of
the timber had not been segregated and belonged to another group of persons.
Thus, the latter held a single estate consisting of an undivided 1/11 interest in
the land and growing timber. In an action for partition by licitation brought by
the holders of the 10/11 interest in the timber estate, the court held that the
holders of the 1/11 interest could not be forced to a partition by licitation of the
standing timber. "Plaintiffs and defendants," the court declared, "are not owners
in common of the same estate which is essential under Articles 1289 and 1308 of
the Civil Code for the action of partition. Although plaintiffs undoubtedly own
an undivided estate in timber, separate and apart from the land on which it stands,
they cannot demand a partition from defendants, who hold a single estate under
Article 465 of the Civil Code consisting of an undivided interest in the land and
the growing timber." (Id. at 442, 91 So. at 596.) "Were plaintiffs to prevail,"
the court continued, "the contesting defendants would be required to submit to an
invasion of their land for the purpose of cutting the timber therefrom and to the
segregating of ownership of their single estate in the land to that of land and
timber against their will and consent." (Id. at 444, 91 So. at 597.)
227. See Stanga v. Lake Superior Piling Co., 214 La. 237, 242, 36 So. 2d 778,
779 (1948) : "The failure to fix a time limit in the deed for the removal of such
timber did not invalidate the conveyance; the omission may be supplied by applica-
tion to the courts." See also Willetts Wood Products Co. v. Concordia Land &
Timber Co., 169 La. 240, 124 So. 841 (1929) ; Simmons v. Tremont Lumber Co.,
144 La. 719, 81 So. 263 (1919) ; Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 68 So. 2d
913 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954). The period for the removal of the timber fixed in
the deed cannot be extended by application to the courts. Ward v. Hayes-Ewell
Co., 155 La. 15, 98 So. 740 (1924).
228. See Stanga v. Lake Superior Piling Co., 214 La. 237, 242, 36 So. 2d 778,
779 (1948) : "The transaction was a sale of standing timber, not the granting of
a servitude, and the landowner cannot have the timber declared forfeited to him,
or successfully plead abandonment against defendant's rights under the contract,
until the removal limit has been fixed and has expired." See also Simmons v.
Tremont Lumber Co., 144 La. 719, 81 So. 263 (1919) ; Kavanaugh v. Frost-
Johnson Lumber Co., 149 La. 972, 90 So. 275 (1921). In fixing the time for
removal the courts tend to give effect to the intention of the parties. In the ab-
sence of any indication as to the intention of the parties, the courts accord a
"reasonable" period of time in the light of all the circumstances. See Chicago Mill
& Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 68 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
. 229. See Stanga v. Lake Superior Piling Co., 214 La. 237, 242, 36 So. 2d 778,
780 (1948) : "If the vendee once removes the timber purchased (that which was
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but it is doubtful that it could be stipulated in perpetuity.2 0
After the expiration of the time limit for removal, timber rights
revert to the landowner unless the contrary is provided for in
the contract.2 1 In case of transfer of title to the land, the
reversionary interest belongs to the present landowner.2 2 Cer-
tain cases have indicated that the reversionary interest may be
retained by the former landowner.25 Perhaps retention of the
reversionary interest should not be permitted for the same rea-
sons that perpetual separation of timber rights from the land
ownership should not be recognized.
merchantable on the date of the sale), the contract is terminated, and he cannot
later go on upon the cutover land and renew operations." Clark v. Weaver Bros.
Realty Corp., 197 La. 63, 200 So. 821 (1941). Quite frequently, determination of
timber rights depends on the scope of the conveyance. This is a matter of con-
tractual interpretation. In the absence of any indication as to the intention of the
parties, the rule of interpretation is that only "merchantable timber" on the date
of the purchase or reservation is to be considered as conveyed. See Stanga v. Lake
Superior Piling Co., supra; Clark v. Weaver Bros. Realty Corp., supra; Cooley
v. Meridian Lumber Co., 195 La. 631, 197 So. 255 (1940).
230. See Willetts Wood Products Co. v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 169
La. 240, 243, 124 So. 841, 842 (1929) : "[Tlhe owner of the timber can [not]
require that the timber be permitted to remain on the land in perpetuity without
any right in the owner of the land to cause the timber to be removed. No such
impossible situation was ever intended or contemplated . . . ." In Cooley v.
Meridian Lumber Co., 195 La. 631, 197 So. 255 (1940), the contract provided for
the removal within a period of 50 years of "all timber standing, being and growing
on" the land. Plaintiff landowner claimed that the removal period was "unreason-
able" and that, in any case, the contract conveyed title only to "merchantable"
timber on the date of conveyance. Without discussion of the question of "reason-
ableness," the court held for plaintiff: the grant included only merchantable timber
at the time of contracting. Further, the court declared that "a sale of timber with
a term of [50] years for removal thereof amounts, in practice at least, to a lease
or a grant in favor of the vendee of the use of the soil for the production of timber
during that time. Such was never contemplated by the parties." Id. at 649, 197
So. at 261.
231. See Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co. v. Burns, 191 La. 733, 738, 186 So.
85, 87 (1939) : "It is well settled that if, in a sale of standing timber, a time
limit upon the right of the buyer to remove the timber from the land is fixed in
the deed, the title to the timber that is not removed within the time stipulated
reverts to the seller, or to his successors or transferees." See also Ward v. Hayes-
Ewell Co., 155 La. 15, 98 So. 740 (1924). Of. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v.
Lewis, 68 So. 2d 913, 916 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) : "It is argued that where,
in a sale of standing timber, a time limit upon the right of the buyer to remove
the timber is fixed in the deed, the title to the timber that is not removed within
the time stipulated reverts to the landowner. This legal contention is sound as is
well recognized in our jurisprudence, but is without application where the reserver
stipulates by clear expression an intent to retain ownership of the timber."
232. See Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co. v. Burns, 191 La. 733, 180 So; 85
(1939).
233. See, e.g., Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 68 So. 2d 913 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1954). In this case, a landowner in 1918 had sold all merchantable timber
growing on his land with a stipulated period for removal of 25 years. Shortly
before expiration of this period, he sold the land to its present owner subject to a
reservation of all the growing merchantable timber. In an action by the former
landowner and "reserver" of the timber estate against the present landowner, to
restrain him from cutting timber, the court held that upon termination of the 1918
contract the timber rights reverted to the "reserver" and not the present land-
owner.
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The preceding considerations indicate that sale and reserva-
tion of standing timber in Louisiana create real rights which
approximate full ownership of an immovable while the timber
stands and become complete ownership of a movable after the
timber is cut down. The time limit for removal and the exist-
ence of reversionary interests indicate that timber rights are
less than full ownership in Louisiana. They should be regarded
as a permissible dismemberment of land ownership and, perhaps,
should be classified as a sui generis real right. This right differs
from emphyteusis since no annual canon is due but could be
regarded as a species of superficies.
4. Restraints on the Use and Disposition of Property-
Under the Civil Code, restraints on the use and disposition
of property2 4 can be either personal obligations2 35 or servi-
tudes, 236 i.e., real rights established in conformity with the ap-
plicable code provisions and following the land in the hands
of any possessor. Contemporary developments in Louisiana,
however, have brought into focus the question whether restraints
on the use and disposition of property may be sui generis real
rights distinct and distinguishable from servitudes. This ques-
tion arises frequently in connection with the issue of the validity
of so-called "building restrictions."2 37
In a leading case, Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeau,235
the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that the three elements
234. The expression "restraints on the use or disposition of property" is broad
enough to include servitudes (personal and real, conventional and legal), real
obligations, "equitable restrictions" or "covenants running with the land," and
(strictly speaking) "building restrictions." Restraints on the use or disposition
of property are ordinarily imposed in order to preserve and enhance real property
values by the maintenance of certain building standards and uniformity in the
use of the land.
235. See Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929). See also Lou-
isiana & A. Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403, 411-13
(1912) (separate opinion on rehearing by Provosty, J.).
236. See text at notes 113-17 supra. It might be argued that restraints on the
use or disposition of property may be neither personal obligations nor servitudes
-but "real obligations" under the Civil Code. "Real obligations," however, are not
an independent category of rights under the Code but merely the passive side of
all real rights.
237. From the viewpoints of urban and suburban development, "building re-
strictions" constitute the most important category of restraints on the use of land.
Building restrictions have been defined as limitations on the use of property "in-
serted in deeds in pursuance of a general plan devised by the ancestor in title to
maintain certain building standards and uniform improvements." Salerno v. De
Lucca, 211 La. 659, 666, 30 So. 2d 678, 679 (1947) and cases cited. The require-
ments of an "ancestor in title" and of "a general plan" are said to distinguish
building restrictions from servitudes. See Comment, Building Restrictions in Lou-
isiana, 21 LA. L. REv. 468, 469 (1961) and cases cited.
238. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
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of ownership, the usus, fructus, and abusus, are susceptible of
subdivision within certain limits. Thus, a restriction on the
right to alienate (abusus) to persons of a particular race was
declared to be valid and enforceable by means of an injunction
so long as the restraint was not perpetual but for a "reasonable"
duration. The court also stated that such a restriction could
operate as a resolutory condition so that its violation might
give rise to an action for the resolution of the sale rather than
merely to a right for the enforcement of the restrictions. 239 Re-
strictions on the right to dispose of property to persons of a par-
ticular race are no longer enforceable 240 but restrictions on
alienation to certain classes of individuals on grounds other
than race, and for a reasonable period of time, may still be
valid. These restrictions, where valid, are veritable real rights
and should be classified as servitudes, whether personal or
real.2 1
Not only the abusus but also the usus of property may
validly be restricted within certain limits. Indeed, landowners
and developers of urban and suburban land have since the
beginning of the century imposed restrictions limiting future
use of property to certain specified purposes, prohibiting the
erection of certain types of structures, or specifying the type
and value of buildings to be erected. 24 2 Louisiana courts have
thus been faced with the problem of enforcing these restrictions
239. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2045 (1870). Where an injunction affords ade-
quate relief, resolution of the sale should not be allowed. See Hebert & Lazarus,
The Louisiana Legislation of 1938, 1 LA. L. REV. 80, 113 (1939). In addition to
injunction and resolutory action, remedies available for violation of restrictions
may be, in appropriate cases, an action for damages, an action for the forceful
removal of buildings, and an action for nuisance. See Comment, Building Restric-
tions in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REV. 468, 472 (1961).
240. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The United States Supreme
Court has held that judicial proceedings enforcing racially discriminatory cove-
nants by injunction or damage actions constitute state or federal action in depri-
vation of the equal protection of the laws. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948) ; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
241. See Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
The servitude would be real if established in favor of another estate and personal
if established in favor of a person. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 646-48 (1870). On
the possibility of creation of personal servitudes other than usufruct, use, or hab-
itation, see notes 113-17 supra, and the excellent dissertation of Provosty, J., in his
separate opinion on rehearing in Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co.,
131 La. 288, 59 So. 403, 411-28 (1912).
242. See McGuffy v. Well, 240 La. 758, 125 So. 2d 154 (1960); Cambais v.
Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929) ; Clark v. Reed, 122 So. 2d 344 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1960) ; Sherrouse Realty Co. v. Marine, 46 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1950) ; LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43 So. 2d 263 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949);
Chexnayder v. Rogers, 95 So. 2d 381 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957) ; Comment,
"Equitable Restrictions" in Louiisana, 33 TuL. L. REV. 822 (1959).
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to protect the interests of former landowners or of landowners
who bought in reliance upon the restrictions placed on neigh-
boring property. In that regard, the courts had to balance the
demands of a firmly established public policy opposing restric-
tions on the use and alienability of property248 with the require-
ments of contractual freedom and the right of individuals to
dispose of their property as they please. 244
In order to afford protection in concrete cases, Louisiana
courts had to develop techniques designed to dispense with the
requirement of "privity" between violators of the restrictions
and persons seeking to enforce them. And to attain this end,
Louisiana courts have classified building restrictions as servi-
tudes, real obligations, and covenants running with the land.245
Building restrictions pertaining to the height of buildings, build-
ing set-offs from property lines, value of buildings to be erected,
and commercial use have been almost consistently classified by
Louisiana courts as predial servitudes.246 Authority for this
classification was properly found in Article 728 of the Civil
Code, which was treated, at least by implication, as merely
illustrative of permissible servitudes. But as predial servitudes
243. See Female Orphan Society v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 119 La. 278,
44 So. 15 (1907) ; Comment, Restraints on the Power of Conventional Alienation
of Immovables in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV. 262 (1933).
244. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 491, 1764 (1870).
245. As a general rule, obligations (i.e., personal rights) cannot be enforced
by persons who are not in privity with the obligor. Res inter alios acta alliis non
nocet. In order to afford protection in concrete cases, therefore, Louisiana courts
should either assert the existence of privity and enforce the restriction as a per-
sonal obligation or classify it as a real right which can be enforced irrespective
of privity. Restrictions which could easily classify as servitudes have not involved
problems. But, in the opinion of the courts, several of these restrictions can not
classify as servitudes either because there is no dominant estate or because they
consist in faciendo. And in order to justify the enforcement of the restriction in
the absence of privity, the courts resort to the classification of particular restric-
tions as "real obligations" or as "covenants running with the land." Actually, the
difficulty posed by the requirement of a dominant estate is presented only in con-
nection with a subdivision situation where the subdivider imposes certain restric-
tions before he sells his first lot. And even in this case, though the restriction
does not constitute a servitude, it is a "destination made by the owner" under
Articles 767-68 of the Civil Code and can become a servitude as soon as the tract
of land is subdivided into several lots. Carlon v. Marquart, 10 So. 2d 246 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1942). It seems therefore that there is no obstacle whatsoever for
the classification of building restrictions as servitudes under the Code.
246. See McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So. 2d 154 (1960); Holloway
v. Ransome, 216 La. 317, 43 So. 2d 673 (1949) ; Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co.
v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938) ; Goodwin v. Alexander, 105 La. 658,
30 So. 102 (1901) ; Heirs of Delongy v. Mercer, 43 La. Ann. 205, 8 So. 903
(1891). It should be noted, however, that in most of these cases the expressions
"real obligations" and "covenants running with the land" were aio employed as
equivalents to "servitudes." Cf. Clark v. Reed, 122 So. 2d 344 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1960) (building restrictions termed "servitudes, real rights or obligations, or cove-
nants running with the land").
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must be for the benefit of another estate and may not involve
affirmative duties, 247 the Louisiana Supreme Court felt com-
pelled in Cambais v. Douglas248 to interpret a deed imposing
affirmative duties as establishing a personal obligation rather
than a servitude.
In a second line of cases, building restrictions are termed
"real obligations" accompanying the land in the hands of sub-
sequent purchasers. 249  This classification is said to rest on
Article 2012 of the Civil Code. The Louisiana Supreme Court
has indicated in the past that the enumeration of real obliga-
tions in Article 2012 is exclusive rather than illustrative; and,
since building restrictions are not mentioned therein, they could
not be classified as real obligations. 20 But the Court of Appeal
for the First Circuit declared in Tucker v. Woodside251 that the
building restrictions are real obligations within the meaning of
Article 2012, distinguishable from predial servitudes. According
to this classification, assumption of affirmative duties is pos-
sible and the requirement of a dominant estate as well as the
problem of lack of privity are effectively dispensed with.
Finally, in a third line of cases, building restrictions have
been classified as "covenants running with the land. ' 252 This is
common law terminology deriving from institutions so foreign
to civil law property that its continued use can only result in
confusion. In common law jurisdictions, chancery courts faced
with the problem of validity of restrictions concerning use of
lands among persons other than the original contracting par-
247. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 648-53, 655 (1870).
248. 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929). In this case, the purchaser bound
himself to erect "a single residence" on a particular lot. It seems that the court
grasped at a straw when it characterized the obligation in question as one in
faciendo. Obviously, the intention of the parties was that no 'building other than
a single residence should be erected. What then if the parties had employed this
negative expression? Perhaps the true ground of decision was the observation of
the court that there was no "general development plan" as in a subdivision
situation ; in these circumstances the court was not willing to recognize the
existence of a real right.
249. See Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So. 2d 678 (1947); Queens-
borough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915) ; Tucker v. Wood-
side, 53 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951). Cf. Ouachita Home Site & Realty
Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938) ("real obligations" which "may be
likened to servitudes").
250. Cambais v. Douglas, 167 La; 791, 120 So. 369 (1929).
251. 53 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
252. See Pizzolato v. Cataldo, 202 La. 675, 12 So.2d 677 (1943); Hill v.
William P. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928); Herzberg v. Harrison,
102 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) ("real rights running with the land") ;
LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949) (particular con-
tract was not a covenant runnihg with the land).
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ties, gradually fashioned old institutions of contract law into a
doctrine of "equitable restrictions. '25 8 This doctrine, applicable
to "covenants running with the land," has been imported to
Louisiana quite uncritically and unnecessarily. Article 728 of
the Civil Code, applied by analogy, could produce comparable
results entirely compatible with Louisiana's civilian past and
present.
Whether termed servitudes, real obligations, or covenants
running with the land, building restrictions in Louisiana are
veritable real rights. 254 They are clearly a dismemberment of
the right of ownership, most frequently of the right to use or
to dispose of, and can be asserted against the world. Preferably,
building restrictions should be classified as a species of predial
servitudes imposed for the benefit of another estate or other
estates, with certain peculiar characteristics concerning their
creation, enforcement, and extinction 25 5 which distinguish them
from ordinary predial servitudes. The recent jurisprudence of
the Louisiana Supreme Court tends to establish uniform and
consistent terminology in this respect by classifying building
restrictions as continuous nonapparent servitudes.2- There is
no good reason to support the borrowing of common law termi-
nology and doctrine nor the classification of building restric-
tions as real obligations. The nature of real obligations is contro-
versial and the concept itself conf using. 25 7
5. Chattel Mortgage. - Industrialization and expansion of
business rendered necessary the introduction of the chattel mort-
gage in Louisiana as an additional security device.258  While
253. Comment, "Equitable Restrictions" in Louisiana, 33 TUL. L. REV. 822,
826 (1959). See also 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 161 (1962) ; CLA.RK, COVENANTS
AND INTEREST RUNNING WITH THE LAND 93-94 (1947).
254. See Salerno v. DeLucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So. 2d 678 (1947) ; Edwards v.
Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941) ; Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux,
136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
255. Comment, Building Restrictions in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REv. 468, 470,
471, 473 (1961); Comment, "Equitable Restrictions" in Louisiana, 33 TUL. L.
REV. 822, 828, 834, 836 (1959).
256. McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 764, 125 So. 2d 154, 157 ;(1960) : "The
restrictive covenant, asserted herein, is a continuous non-apparent servitude."
Accordingly, "such a servitude can be established only by title." Ibid. See also
Clark v. Reed, 122 So.2d 344, 349 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) : "The servitude need
not be necessarily established by a deed or created in an act of sale. It suffices
that the servitude was created and imposed in an act sufficient in form for the
transfer of property."
257. On the confusion of ideas surrounding the notion of real obligations, see
GINOSSAR, DRoIT RltEL, PROPRIT]k ET CRtANcE 94-101 (1961).
258. See DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 17 (1942).
"Prior to the year 1912, a chattel mortgage was unknown to the laws of Lou-
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originally limited to certain specifically enumerated species of
movable property,259 the chattel mortgage device became grad-
ually available on all kinds of corporeal movable property260
including universalities of things.261 Hypothecation of movables
is not a principle foreign to civil law. 262 Under the regime of
the Louisiana Civil Code, however, mortgage was available only
on corporeal immovable property, certain enumerated incor-
poreal immovables, and ships which though movables were for
this particular purpose subject to rules governing immovable
property. 263 Adoption of the chattel mortgage in Louisiana can-
not be regarded as a break with the civilian tradition, particu-
larly since the device was shaped by the legislature and courts
upon firm civilian doctrine. 264
Chattel mortgage may be defined as a contract whereby the
owner hypothecates corporeal movable property as security for
the performance of an obligation. 26 5 The contract creates merely
a privilege and does not involve transfer of title to the prop-
erty.26 6 The chattel mortgage is always accessory of a principal
debt upon which it depends for its very existence. Discharge of
the principal debt thus terminates the chattel mortgage, though
foreclosure of the mortgage does not always extinguish the
principal debt.2 67 The chattel mortgage possesses practically the
isiana and such a mortgage executed in another state was not enforceable in this
State after the mortgaged chattel had been brought here." General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Nuss, 195 La. 209, 196 So. 323, 324 (1940). See also Delop v.
Windsor, 26 La. Ann. 185 (1874) ; Franklin v. Warfield, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 442
(La. 1830).
259. See La. Acts 1912, No. 65: "lumber, logs and livestock." For a historical
analylsis of Louisiana chattel mortgage legislation see DAGGETT, LOUISIANA
PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 18-20 (1942) ; Miller, The Louisiana Chattel
Mortgage and Small Loan Acts, 23 TUL. L. REv. 61 (1948).
260. See LA. R.S. 9:5365 (1950); Boyd v. Hendrickson, 175 La. 377, 143
So. 332 (1932). The appropriate security device for incorporeal movables is
pledge. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3155 (1870). Cf. LA. R.S. 9:4301-04 (1950)
(pledge of rights under mineral leases and contracts) ; LA. R.S. 9:4321-23 (1950)
(pledge of incorporeal rights not evidenced in writing).
261. See LA. R.S. 9:5351 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 50,
La. Acts 1956, No. 90; Louisiana Legislation of 1948-Chattel Mortgage, 9 LA.
L. REV. 21-22 (1948). On the concept of universalities of things, see Yiannopou-
los, Introduction to the Law of Things, 22 LA. L. REV. 756, 781 (1962).
262. See 12 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
12-13 (1953).
263. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3289 (1870). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE p. 458, art. 36
(1808) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3256 (1825). Cf. Shepherd v. The Orleans Cotton
Press Co., 2 La. Ann. 100 (1847).
264. See DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 18 (1942).
265. See Boyd v. Hendrickson, 175 La. 377, 143 So. 332 (1932).
266. See General Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 192 So. 248 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1939), reversed on other grounds, 195 La. 209, 196 So. 323 (1940) ; DAGGETT,
LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 21 (1942).
267. See Motor Finance Co. v. Universal Motors, 182 So. 143 (La. App. 1st
1963]
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same attributes as the mortgage on immovables 2 s and differs
from pledge of movables (pawn) in several regards. Actual
delivery of movable property to the pledgee is essential to a
pledge, while the chattel mortgage is valid without delivery;269
a pledge may be made of both corporeal and incorporeal mov-
ables, while chattel mortgage may affect corporeal movables
only ;270 the pledge is valid as between the parties even if orally
constituted and effective against third parties if proved by
written instrument,, while the chattel mortgage must be always
in writing and must be duly recorded in order to affect third
parties 1.27
The chattel mortgage is a security device independent of
other available remedies. A creditor whose debt is secured by
a chattel mortgage may proceed to enforce the personal responsi-
bility of his debtor and ignore his security completely or he
may choose to foreclose his mortgage by ordinary or executory
proceedings. 272 The holder of a chattel mortgage can enforce
his right even though the chattel has become an immovable by
nature or by destination under Articles 464, 467-469 of the
Cir. 1938) ; General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Barrow, 136 So. 902 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1931). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3284, 3285 (1870).
268. See LA. R.S. 9:5363 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 441: "All
laws and rules and all remedies and processes now or hereafter made available to
creditors for the protection or enforcement of their rights under mortgages affect-
ing immovables shall be available to creditors of obligations secured by mortgages
affecting movables." Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3278-3289 (1870).
269. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3152, 3162 (1870). Cf. LA. R.S. 9:5351 (1950),
as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 50, La. Acts 1956, No. 90.
270. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3154, 3155 (1870). Cf. LA. R.S. 9:5365 (1950)
Boyd v. Hendrickson, 175 La. 377, 143 So. 332 (1932).
271. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE 3158 (1870). Cf. LA. R.S. 9:5354 (1950), as
amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 481: "Every such mortgage shall be effective as
against third persons from the time of filing in the proper offices, and the filing
shall be notice to all parties of the existence of the mortgage, which shall be
superior in rank to any privilege or preference arising subsequently thereto."
As between the parties, however, the chattel mortgage is effective from its execu-
tion. See Harris Finance Corp. v. Fridge, 219 La. 1106, 55 So.2d 707 (1951)
United Novelty Co. v. Salemi, 68 So. 2d 808 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
272. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3721-22 (ordinary proceedings)
arts. 2631-2754, 3721, 3723 (executory proceedings) (1960). Cf. Morris
Plan Bank v. Glockner, 161 So. 792 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935) ; Monroe Automo-
bile & Supply Co. v. Bowman, 15 La. App. 203, 131 So. 585 (2d Cir. 1930).
Under Article 2631 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, executory proceed-
ings are available only where the mortgage or privilege is evidenced by "authentic
act." However, chattel mortgages "under private signature" duly acknowledged
are specifically enforceable by virtue of La. Acts 1952, No. 441. See LA. CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2631 (1960), Comment (c) (2) ; General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 So.2d 417 (1.953) ; Note, 14 LA. L. REV.
289 (1953). As to the availability of executory proceedings in the case of a
chattel mortgage on a motor vehicle under private signature duly acknowledged,
see LA. CoDE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2631 (1960), Comment (c) (3).
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Civil Code ;273 he has also the right to pursue the property in
the hands of a third possessor, provided that his right has not
been paralyzed by peremption of the recordation, prescription
of the principal obligation, or by the limited application of the
bona fide purchaser doctrine. 274  The chattel mortgagee thus
enjoys both the right of preference and the right to follow the
property.2 75 Provided that his right is superior in rank, the
chattel mortgagee may assert it by filing an intervention in a
proceeding under which the property subject to the mortgage
is seized by other creditors. 276 But the chattel mortgagee cannot
enforce his right by taking possession of the property without
legal process or without the consent of the debtor.277 All these
attributes and characteristics of the chattel mortgagee's right
make it plain that it should be classified as a real right in
Louisiana.2 78
273. See LA. R.S. 9:5357 (1950). This statute declares that a mortgaged
chattel "shall be and remain movable so far as the mortgage upon it is concerned."
See also LA. R.S. 9:5351 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 50, La. Acts
1956, No. 90: "[S]uch building or buildings erected from such [mortgaged]
materials shall, notwithstanding any other provision of the Revised Statutes or
of the Civil Code, have the status of a movable for the purpose of the mortgage
and shall be covered thereby and R.S. 9:5357 shall apply thereto." See also
Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 22
LA. L. REV. 517, 544-47 (1962).
274. LA. R.S. 9:5354 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 481. With
respect to the rights of a third possessor, see LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art.
3743 (1960). Cf. Gulf States Finance Corp. v. Moses, 56 So.2d 221 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1951) (extinction of a chattel mortgage according to the applicable provi-
sions of the Civil Code).
275. See LA. R.S. 9:5363 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 441; LA.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 2378, 3741-43 (hypothecary action) (1960);
Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Leger, 169 So. 170 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) (mortgages
whether on movables or immovables confer a right of preference and the right to
follow) ; Black v. 0. K. Radiator & Sheet Metal Works, 152 So. 782 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1934) (holder of chattel mortgage has the right, in appropriate cases,
to pursue the property in the hands of third persons by hypothecary action or
otherwise).
276. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 1091-92 (1960). In general,
the broadened concept of "intervention" operates in the same manner as the
"third opposition" under Articles 395 through 403 of the Code of Practice of 1870.
Id., Comment (a). Cf. Roberts v. Atkins, 141 So. 427 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932) ;
Soady Building Co. v. Collins, 137 So. 631 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931) ; Securities
Sales Co. of Louisiana v. Breithaupt, 7 La. App. 417 (2d Cir. 1928).
277. Illegal seizure of a mortgaged chattel constitutes an "offense" under
Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See Hernandez v. Harson, 237 La. 389,
111 So.2d 320 (1959) ; Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 223
La. 504, 66 So.2d 317 (1953) ; Harris v. Franklin Finance Co., 65 So.2d 798
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1953) ; Harris v. Stem, 30 So.2d 889 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1947) ; Elders v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 172 So. 191 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937) ;
Horton v. Kavanaugh-Hinton Motor Co., 15 La. App. 226, 131 So. 497 (2d Cir.
1931) ; Reed v. Shreveport Furniture Co., 7 La. App. 134 (2d Cir. 1927).
278. Cf. text at notes 68-69 supra. AP iur the case of all real rights, a chattel
mortgage cannot be constituted on indefinite future property. See Note, 15 TUL.
L. REV. 314 (1941). But a previously executed chattel mortgage may attach as
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6. Privileges. - The question of the juridical nature of priv-
ileges and their classification as personal or real rights has
prompted exhaustive discussion and controversies in the litera-
ture of civil law.279 In the French Civil Code, privileges are dealt
with in a subdivision of Title XVIII, Book III, devoted to "Priv-
ileges and Mortgages." The Louisiana Civil Code, Book III,
Title XXI, deals with privileges and the following Title XXII in
the same book is devoted to mortgages. Apart from this sys-
tematic arrangement, which tends to distinguish between priv-
ileges and mortgages, the relevant articles in the Louisiana Civil
Code follow in the main the arrangement and substantive con-
tent of the corresponding articles in the French Civil Code.
The Louisiana Civil Code establishes the general rule that
"the property of the debtor is the common pledge of his creditors,
and the proceeds of its sale must be distributed among them
ratably, unless there exist among the creditors some lawful
causes of preference" (Article 3183). Such "lawful causes of
preference" are privileges and mortgages (Article 3183). Priv-
ilege is defined as "a right, which the nature of a debt gives to
a creditor, and which entitles him to be preferred before other
creditors, even those who have mortgages" (Article 3186). Priv-
ileges may exist on movables, immovables, or both (Article
3189). Privileges on movables may be "either general, or special
on certain movables" (Article 3190). General privileges on
movables are enumerated in Article 3191 and special privileges in
Article 3217. Privileges on immovables may also be general or
special; the Code does not say so expressly but this is apparent
in the light of detailed provisions. Thus, Article 3249 enumerates
as special privileges on immovables the vendor's privilege, the
privilege of those furnishing labor and supplies, and the priv-
ilege of those "making or repairing levees, bridges, ditches, and
roads on the land." Article 3252 enumerates general privileges
which attach both to movables and immovables.
Mortgage is defined as "a right granted to the creditor over
the property of the debtor for the security of his debt, and gives
soon as specifically described property subject to such a mortgage is acquired.
See Soady Building Co. v. Collins, 18 La. App. 164, 137 So. 631 (2d Cir. 1931).
279. Of. 2 PLANIOL, TRFATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW pt. 2, p. 426 (1959) : "Al-
though the notion of privilege was simple in Roman law, it has become uncertain
and confused in modern law; they have brought together under this single name
things quite different, to such an extent that it is today impossible to give to
privilege a self-contained and unified theory." (Translation by the Louisiana State
Law Institute).
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him the power of having the property seized and sold in default
of payment" (Article 3278). The Code indicates that "mortgage
is a species of pledge, the thing mortgaged being bound for the
payment of the debt or fulfillment of the obligation" (Article
3279). Mortgages are distinguished as general or special (Ar-
ticle 3288) and as conventional, legal, or judicial (Article 3286).
Conventional mortgages may be either general or special, de-
pending on the agreement of the parties (Article 3290). Legal
mortgages are general mortgages in the absence of legal pro-
vision to the contrary (Article 3328). According to Article 3329
"the creditors who have either a privilege or mortgage on im-
movables recorded according to law may pursue their claims
thereon into whatever hands the immovables may pass, as pro-
vided in Article 2378, or in Articles 3721 through 3743, respec-
tively, of the Code of Civil Procedure."
Commentators elaborating on corresponding provisions in the
French Civil Code have reached at least three different conclu-
sions concerning the juridical nature of privileges in general and
the classification of each particular privilege as a personal or
real right. According to one view all privileges are real rights.280
Under a second view privileges (other than the real rights of
pledge and mortgage) are merely causes of preference attached
to personal rights.28 ' Finally, according to a third view, privileges
may be either personal or real rights depending on whether they
bear on movables or immovables and on whether they are gen-
eral or special privileges. Thus, it has been urged that special
privileges on immovables are real rights (hypoth6ques privi-
legiies) while special privileges on movables and general priv-
ileges on immovables are personal rights. 28 2 It would seem that
280. See POPLAWSKI, LA NOTION DE PRIVIL]tGE EN DROIT ROMAINE ET EN DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS 295-303 (Diss. Bordeaux 1913); 13 BEUDANT ET LEREBouRs-
PIGEONNIkRE, COUR DR DROIT CIVIL 300 (1948).
281. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIrRE, TRAIT4 DE DROIT
CIVIL 94143 (1953). In this treatise mortgage and pledge are classified as species
of the genus "privilege." The notion of privilege is thus broadened to include real
rights (mortgage, pledge and special privileges on movables and immovables in
the nature of real security and rights of preference (all privileges other than real
rights).
282. See 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA I L1IMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 877
(1937) ; 12 id., TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 272-76 (1953). Of. 3
AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 185-86 (1900). In this treatise
privileges are distinguished into purely personal, real, and mixed. "Purely per-
sonal" are the general privileges on movables and the special privileges on mov-
ahies with the exception of those attached to the real right of pledge. "Real" are
the privileges on immovables whether general or special, and the right of mortgage.
"Mixed" are the special privileges on movables incidental to a contractual or
statutory right of pledge.
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the controversy is without purpose. An analytically preferable
approach is to regard privileges as accessorial rights of prefer-
ence which may be attached by the law to any right, whether per-
sonal or real.28 3 This view is supported by Article 3186 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, which declares that privilege is "a right
which the nature of a debt gives to a creditor." Accordingly, a
relevant question is which privileged rights are real and which
personal.
In France, classification of privileged rights as personal or
real is said to be determinative of the questions of divisibility of
the privilege and of its enforcement in the hands of third par-
ties. 2 4 Courts in Louisiana, however, are seldom inclined to de-
rive practical consequences from abstract classifications. The
process is reversed and a privileged right can be classified as
personal or real only in the light of its function. The special
privileges on immovables created by Article 3249 of the Civil
Code function as veritable mortgages and should be regarded as
attached to real rights.285 All other privileges in the Civil Code
whether bearing on movables or immovables are merely causes
of preference incidental to personal rights. Similarly, some of
the privileges created by special legislation are attached to real
rights28 6 and others to personal rights.28 7 Detailed functional
analysis of all privileges in Louisiana would exceed the scope
of this study. In the following pages dealing with the nature of
vendor's and lessor's rights, attention will be necessarily focused
on privileges accorded to vendors and lessors in Louisiana.
7. Vendor's Rights. - The vendor of movables and immov-
ables has under the Louisiana Civil Code a "privilege" on the
things sold for the payment of the purchase price.288 In addition,
the unpaid vendor has the right to demand the dissolution of sales
on credit by judicial process 289 and the dissolution of cash sales
283. Cf. BAUDRY-LACANTINEBIE, TRAIT.A DE DROIT CIVIL, V Supplement by
Bonnecase 478 (1930) ("privilege is the quality of a right").
284. See 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIkRE, TRArTr DE DROIT
civiL 941-42 (1953).
285. Cf. text at note 282 supra; text at notes 322-23 infra.
286. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 9:4501 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1;
LA. R.S. 9:4502 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1.
287. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 9:4801 (1950) as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 60,
§ 1; LA. R.S. 9:4813 (1950).
288. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3217, 3327 (movables) ; arts. 3249, 3271 (im-
movables) (1870).
289. See LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2561 (1870). Dissolution of the sale under Ar-
ticle 2561 may be effected only by judicial proceedings. Mossy Motors v. McRed-
mond, 12 So. 2d 719 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943). Article 2561 applies to both mov-
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of movables by extra-judicial notice.29 The juridical nature of
the privilege and of the right of dissolution will be considered
separately.
The vendor's privilege is a distinct right of security for the
unpaid balance of the thing sold.' 1 It is a substantive, 2 acces-
sorial-3 right which exists only on the property sold. 294 It arises
by operation of law as a legal concomitant to a contract of sale2 5
and is transferable to the vendor's successors by operation of law
without contractual subrogation. 6 The privilege may attach to
any object, movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal,
which is susceptible of alienation by a contract of sale. The priv-
ilege exists between the parties without recordation as to both
movables and immovables.2 7 A vendor's privilege on immovables
ables and immovables. Atkins v. Garrett, 252 Fed. 280 (W.D. La. 1917).
290. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3229 (1870). It has been suggested that the
right of dissolution under this article is available to the vendor without the need
of judicial proceedings. See DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORT-
GAGE 101 (1942). But cf. Millaudon v. New Orleans Water Co., 11 Mart.(O.S.)
278 (La. 1822) (indicating, under the corresponding article of the 1808 Code, the
necessity of judicial dissolution). For other rights and remedies of the vendor
under Louisiana law, see Comment, The Action of Resolution as an Accessory of
the Credit in Contracts of Sale, 1 LA. L. REV. 800, n. 3 (1939).
291. See Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699 (1857); note 325 infra;
DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 90-168 (1942) ; Com-
ment, The Conditional Sale in Louisiana, 2 LA. L. REV. 338 (1940). The vendor's
privilege, as a right of preference, is distinguishable from any contractual or statu-
tory right that a vendor may have to seize and remove the things sold from the
purchaser's premises. Under the Louisiana Constitution, homestead property and
certain items of personal property are exempt from seizure, but if subject to a
vendor's privilege, they may be seized. LA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2. However,
according to LA. R.S. 9:4563 (1950), property exempt from seizure cannot be
seized and removed by vendors "under the assumption that a buyer or transferee
has by agreement given the right of entry and removal." Unlawful seizure and
removal of personal property by the vendor gives rise to claim for damages. Luthy
v. Philip Werlein Co., 163 La. 752, 112 So. 709 (1927). Seizure of sewing
machines and pianos for the enforcement of a vendor's privilege is authorized by
LA. R.S. 9:4561 (1950).
292. Willey v. St. Charles Hotel Co., 52 La. Ann. 1581, 28 So. 182 (1899)
Whiston v. Stodder, 8 Mart.(O.S.) 95 (La. 1820).
293. See State ex rel. Landry v. Broussard, 177 So. 403 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1937) ; Perot v. Levasseur, 21 La. Ann. 529 (1869).
294. See Forrey v. Strange, 158 La. 941, 105 So. 21 (1925) ; Posner v. Little
Pine Lumber Co., 157 La. 73, 102 So. 16 (1924) ; Ferguson & Hall v. Creditors,
19 La. 278 (1841).
295. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3227, 3249 (1870) ; DeJean v. Hebert, 31 La.
Ann. 729 (1879) ; Boner v. Mahle, 3 La. Ann. 600 (1848). In that respect, a pre-
liminary issue arises as to the characterization of a particular contract as one of
sale. See Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Kent, 70 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1934) ;
St. Mary Iron Works v. Community Manufacturing Enterprise, 119 So. 564 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1929).
296. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2645 (1870) ; Succession of Forstall, 39 La. Ann.
1052, 3 So. 277 (1887) ; Perot v. Levasseur, 21 La. Ann. 529 (1869) ; Jeckell v.
Fried, 18 La. Ann. 192 (1866). See also Smith v. Taylor, 14 La. Ann. 663
(1859) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2161 (1870).
297. See Schutzman v. Dobrowolski, 191 La. 791, 186 So. 338 (1939) ; Thomp-
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must be recorded to affect interest of third parties.29 In gen-
eral, there is no machinery available for the recordation of a
vendor's privilege on movables 2 9 though it appears from the re-
ported cases that solicitous parties have at times recorded such
privileges in the chattel or real mortgage records.3 0
Vendor's privileges on movables, as well as unrecorded priv-
ileges on immovables, are lost when the things sold are no longer
in the physical possession of the purchaser. 01 As an exception to
this general rule, limited protection has been given to certain
vendors by special legislation.30 2 Where the purchaser resells
things burdened with a vendor's privilege, a question arises as
to whether the original vendor retains a privilege on the price.
The vendor does not have a general privilege on the property of
the purchaser for the payment of the price308 and, therefore, in
case of a cash sale by the purchaser the privilege of the original
vendor is lost. But if the price has not been paid by the second
purchaser, the price is said to represent the goods; accordingly,
the original vendor retains his privilege on the debt.30 4 Where
son v. Comeau, 23 La. Ann. 555 (1871); Sanders v. Dosson, 3 La. Ann. 587
(1848).
298. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3271 (1870). Cf. LA. R.S. 9:2721-24 (1950).
299. Cf. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3227 (1870).
300. See Carlin v. Gordy, 32 La. Ann. 1285 (1880) ; Boner v. Mahle, 3 La.
Ann. 600 (1848).
301. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3227 (1870) ; D. H. Holmes Co. v. Morris, 188
La. 431, 177 So. 417 (1937) ; Dreyfous v. Cade, 138 La. 297, 70 So. 231 (1915) ;
Kuhn & Co. v. Embry & Pilcher, 35 La. Ann. 488 (1883) ; Heard v. Noble, 9 La.
App. 153 (2d Cir. 1928). In that respect, a frequently litigated issue is what con-
stitutes loss of possession by the purchaser. Cf. Flint & Jones v. Rawlings, 20
La. Ann. 557 (1868) (sale and actual delivery to subsequent vendee terminates
original vendee's possession) ; Allen, Nugent & Co. v. Buisson, 35 La. Ann. 108
(1883) (a vendor of cotton is entitled to have the sale annulled for nonpayment
of the price when the vendee is in actual or constructive possession). It had been
held that the execution of a subsequent chattel mortgage on the thing sold does
not involve "alienation" and delivery of possession. Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Succession of McCan, 151 La. 555, 92 So. 55 (1922) ; Weiss v. Hudson
Construction Co., 151 La. 1, 91 So. 525 (1922). Nor does a subsequent real mort-
gage involve alienation and delivery of possession of things subject to a vendor's
privilege, although these things may have been placed on the premises for their
service and improvement. See Cristina Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So. 2d 685
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1951). But a pledge constituted on a thing subject to a vendor's
privilege involves transfer of possession and terminates the privilege of the vendor.
Pierson v. Carmouche, 146 La. 798, 84 So. 59 (1920). For detailed discussion,
see DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE, 119-24 (1942).
302. See LA. R.S. 9:454143 (1950).
303. See Shakespeare, Smith & Co. v. Ware, 38 La. Ann. 570 (1886) ; Ward
v. Brandt, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 331 (La. 1882).
304. See Nelson & Co. v. Simpson, 9 La. Ann. 311 (1854) ; SAUNDERS, LEC-
TURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 503 (1925). In case the things sold are destroyed by
fire, the vendor's privilege attaches to "the claim or money due to the owner or
vendee under policies of insurance covering that property." LA. R.S. 9:4581
(1950).
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the purchaser becomes insolvent, a vendor's privilege attaches to
the proceeds of a sale by receivers, or, in the case of a judicial
sale of the property, to the proceeds in the hands of the court.8 5,
The vendor's privilege on a movable is lost when the thing is
no longer identifiable.3 6 Loss of identity has been held to be a
question of fact. 0 7 Loss of identity occurs clearly when a mov-
able is merged with other similar movables. 30  When a movable
merges with an immovable and becomes an immovable by nature
or by destination, the test of loss of identity involves difficulties.
It is clear that the vendor's privilege is not lost and that a thing
preserves its identity when it becomes an immovable by destina-
tion by being placed by the owner for the "service and improve-
ment" of the immovable.309 But when a movable becomes an
immovable by nature under Articles 464 or 467 of the Civil Code,
or an immovable by destination by virtue of its "permanent at-
tachment" to the immovable under Articles 468 and 469, the
movable may lose its identity and the vendor his privilege.3 10 In
that regard, loss of identity may consist merely in the fact that
the thing cannot be removed without damage to it or to the prop-
erty to which it is attached.3 11 Certain older cases seemed to in-
dicate that recordation could preserve the privilege in case the
movable became an immovable by nature or destination, 3 12 but
305. See Terry v. Terry, 10 La. 68 (1836) ; Millaudon v. New Orleans Water
Co., 11 Mart.(O.S.) 278 (La. 1822).
306. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3228 (1870) ; Newman v. Cannon, 43 La. Ann.
712, 9 So. 439 (1891) ; McCan & Sons v. Bradley, 38 La. Ann. 482 (1886);
Whipple v. Hertzberger, 11 La. Ann. 475 (1856) ; Ferguson & Hall v. Creditors,
19 La. 278 (1841) ; Stackhouse v. Foley's Syndics, 1 Mart.(O.S.) 228 (La. 1811).
307. See Swoop v. St. Martin, 110 La. 237, 34 So. 426 (1903).
308. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3230, 3231 (1870). It has been stated that
these articles have been taken, and applied, in Louisiana, out of context. See
DAGGETr, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 124 (1942). Cf. New-
man v. Cannon, 43 La. Ann. 712, 9 So. 439 (1891) ; Monticello v. Delavisio, 191
So. 162 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939) ; Brown v. Liggett, 141 So. 409 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1932).
309. See Shelly v. Winder, 36 La. Ann. 182 (1884). Cf. Globe Automatic
Sprinkler v. Bell, 183 La. 937, 165 So. 150 (1935) ; Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co.,
175 La. 928, 144 So. 718 (1932) (movables not immobilized). See also Yianno-
poulos,'Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 22 LA. L.
REV. 517, 542-44 (1962).
310. SeeMilliken & Farewell v. Roger, 138 La. 823, 70 So. 848 (1916) ; Gary
v. Burguieres, 12 La. Ann. 227 (1857) ; W. M. Bailey & Sons v. Western Geo-
physical Co., 66 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953) ; Monroe Automobile & Supply
Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927).
311. See Milliken & Farewell v. Roger, 138 La. 823, 70 So. 848 (1916) ; Swoop
v. St. Martin, 110 La. 237, 34 So. 426 (1903) ; Monroe Automobile & Supply Co.
v. Cole,: 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927). Cf. Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., 175
La.: 928, 144 So. 718 (1932) ; Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Bell, 183 La. 937,
165 So. 150 (1936).
312. See Carlin v. Gordy, 32 La. Ann. 1285 (1880) ; Gary v. Burguieres, 12
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other cases have quite correctly dispensed with recordation as
determinative of the question of loss of identity by incorpora-
tion.313 Further, a review of Louisiana jurisprudence supports
the conclusion that a vendor's privilege is never lost merely be-
cause a movable becomes an immovable by nature or destination
but only when it has been so incorporated into an immovable that
its removal is physically impossible or economically unfeasible. 1 4
The vendor's privilege on a movable is also lost when the
thing is resold by the purchaser in confusion with a mass of
similar things.315 Analytically, this is an instance of loss of iden-
tity accompanied by loss of physical possession by the purchaser.
If loss of physical possession by judicial sale in globo is immi-
nent, preference in the proceeds may be secured by separate ap-
praisement fixing the present value of the thing.316 The vendor's
privilege on movables primes subsequent chattel mortgages;
whether the vendor's privilege primes a real mortgagee's right
to claim things immobilized by nature or by destination is ordi-
narily determined by reference to the test of facility of re-
moval.3 17 In any case, to prevent the privilege from being lost by
the foreclosure of a real mortgage, the vendor must intervene. 318
He may seize as long as the movable remains in the possession of
the purchaser and his right "cannot be defeated because the mort-
gage creditor has seized, nor because the period for the sale
under the writ is close at hand. 31 9
The question whether the vendor's privilege is a real right
or merely a right of preference has not been definitely settled in
the jurisprudence. According to Article 3227 the vendor of mov-
La. Ann. 227 (1857) ; Copley v. Sanford, 2 La. Ann. 335 (1847). Cf. Bergeron
v. Patin, 34 La. Ann. 534 (1882).
313. See In re Receivership of Augusta Sugar Co., 134 La. 971, 64 So. 870
(1914); Cristina Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1951).
314. See DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEOES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 133
(1942) Yiannopoulos, Movablea and Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative
Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 517, 542-44 (1962).
315. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3228 (1870) ; Forrey v. Strange, 158 La. 941,
105 So. 21 (1925) ; Adams Mach. Co. v. Newman, 107 La. 702, 32 So. 38 (1902)
Payne v. Buford, 106 La. 83, 30 So. 263 (1901).
316. See Forrey v. Strange, 158 La. 941, 105 So. 21 (1925) ; Lambert v. Saloy,
37 La. Ann. 3 (1885) i Beasley v. Leesville Motor Co., 4 La. App. 262 (1st Cir.
192.5). Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1092 (1960).
317. See text at note 311 8upra.
318. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1092 (1960). Cf. Legendre v.
McCall's Estate, 136 La. 947, 68 So. 86 (1915) ; Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v.
Kent, 70 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1934) ; Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Reynaud, 4
La. App. 290 (1st Cir. 1926).
319. Walburn-Swenson Co. v. Darell, 49 La. Ann. 1044, 1046, 22 So. 310,
311 (1897).
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ables has only "a preference on the price of his property," as dis-
tinguished from a right to follow the property ifito the hands of
a third party. In Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Leger,320 the admoni-
tion was made that "the courts of this state should note a differ-
ence between a privilege which confers a right of preference and
one which also gives the additional right to follow the property
on which it rests into the hands of a third person." In this case,
the court seemed to indicate that a vendor's lien (as distin-
guished from a vendor's recorded chattel mortgage) is not a
real right. But in Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co.,3 21 the Louisiana
Supreme Court declared that "we adhere to the jurisprudence
established in the long line of cases which we have mentioned
and discussed, to the effect that the unpaid vendor enjoys a real
right in the thing sold." In spite of broad judicial language,
however, it seems that the vendor's privilege does not confer a
real right in all cases. Actually, distinction should be made be-
tween privileges on movables and privileges on immovables. As
to movables, it is quite clear from the Code and the cases that
the vendor's privilege is merely a right of preference which can
be exercised as long as the thing remains in the physical posses-
sion of the debtor. In the absence of fraud, the vendor has no
right to follow the thing in the hands of third parties whether
acquiring with notice or not.322 As to immovables, distinction
should be made between recorded and unrecorded privileges. Un-
recorded privileges on immovables are subject to the same rules
governing vendor's privileges on movables. Recorded privileges
on immovables confer on the vendor the right to follow the
thing and enable him to assert his right of preference against
the property in the hands of third persons. Thus, the function
of a recorded privilege on immovables is very similar to that of
a real mortgage and could be regarded as a real right. In France,
doctrine and jurisprudence are firmly settled that the vendor's
privilege on immovables is a privileged special mortgage (hy-
pothique privilegige) .323
The vendor's right of dissolution in case of nonpayment of
the purchase price is a resolutory condition implied by law in all
contracts of sale.124 This right is clearly distinguishable from,
320. 169 So. 170, 173 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
321. 175 La. 928, 144 So. 718, 722 (1932).
322. See Dreyfous v. Cade, 138 La. 297, 70 So. 231 (1915).
323. See 12 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
658-60 (1953).
324. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2045-47, 2561, 3229 (1870) ; Monroe; The Im-
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and independent of, the vendor's privilege and other security
devices.825 Enforcement of the vendor's privilege is "an affirm-
ance of the contract, 3 26 whereas exercise of the right of disso-
lution places "matters in the same state as though the obligation
had not existed. ' 827
The right of dissolution is governed by the code provisions
applicable to resolutory conditions in general and by specific
provisions applicable to sales.8 28 Prerequisites for the exercise
of the right, and effects of its exercise, have not been regulated
in great detail. Articles 2561-2565, in the title dealing with the
obligations of the buyer, regulate certain incidents of dissolu-
tion by judicial action. Article 3229, in the title dealing with
the vendor's privilege, indicates that cash sales of movables may
be set aside by extra-judicial notice within eight days from the
day of delivery, if the things are still in the possession of the
purchaser. There are no provisions granting a corresponding
qualified right of dissolution by extra-judicial notice as to sales
of movables on credit or sales of immovables whether for cash or
credit.
Exercise of the right of dissolution by judicial action does
not involve problems where the things sold remain unencumbered
and in the possession of the original purchaser. But where the
things become burdened by real rights or pass into the hands of
third persons, questions arise as to the availability of dissolution
and its effects upon third persons. In the absence of specific reg-
ulation in the Code, answers to these questions ought to be ob-
tained by application of well-established principles of code in-
terpretation.
In the light of the historical sources of the Louisiana Civil
Code, and on the basis of an argument a contrario from Article
3229, the vendor ought to have the right of dissolution by judi-
plied Resolutory Condition for Non-Performance of a Contract, 12 TUL. L. REV.
376, 509 (1938); Comment, The Action of Resolution as an Accessory of the
Credit in Contracts of Sale, 1 LA. L. REV. 800 (1939).
325. See Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 205 La. 242, 248, 17 So. 2d
264, 266 (1944) : "This court has repeatedly and consistently held that the right
to dissolve or set aside a sale for the non-payment of the purchase price is an
independent, substantive remedy which is in no wise dependent upon the existence
of a mortgage or of a privilege." See also Stevenson v. Brown, 32 La. Ann. 461
(1880) ; School Directors v. Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 739 (1876) ; Shapiro v. Kim-
brough, 20 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944).
326. Heirs of Castle v. Floyd, 38 La. Ann. 583, 587 (1886).
327. Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 205 La. 242, 252, 17 So. 2d 264,
268 (1944).
. 328. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2045-2047, 2561-2565, 3229-3231 (1870).
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dial action in alli cases of nonpayment of the purchase price
whether the sale is for cash 'or credit and whether or not the
things are still in the possession- of the purchaser. After exercise
of the right of dissolution, the vendor ought to be entitled to re-
claim the things sold from any person other than one who ac-
quired ownership by acquisitive prescription. However, distinc-
tion between prerequisites for the-exercise of the vendor's right
of dissolution and effects of its exercise has not been always
made and conceptual difficulties surrounding the incidents and
effects of resolutory conditions in general 329 are reflected in
cases involving dissolution of contracts for nonpayment of the
price. For these reasons, and perhaps in deference to changed
economic and social conditions, Louisiana courts have reached
prIactical results occasionally conflicting with the system of the
Code.
According to the jurisprudence the right of dissolution must
be exercised by action, even in the circumstances indicated in
Article 3229.3 ° Admissibility of the action depends on the vend-
or's ability to restore to the purchaser "the purchase notes and
such part of the price as shall have been paid."' 1 This action,
"although it may result in the recovery of immovable property,
is regarded as a personal action,' ' 3 2 and, accordingly, is subject
to a ten-year liberative prescription from the day of default.
Presumably, after the judgment of dissolution, a subsequent
action for the recovery of property would be subject to the pre-
scription applicable to judgments and its nature would depend
on the species of property involved. Where the property sold
passes' into the hands of third persons, distinction is made be-
tween movables and immovables. As to sales of movables, it has
been held by analogy to the vendor's privilege and Article 3229
that the right of dissolution may be exercised only so long as the
things remain in the possession of the original purchaser. 3 In
329. See Monroe, The Implied Resolutory Conditon for Non-Performanoe of a
Contract, 12 TUL. L. REv. 376 (1938).
330. See note 200 supra.
331. Heirs of Castle v. Floyd, 38 La. Ann. 583, 587 (1886). See also Louis
Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 205 La. 242, 17 So. 2d 264 (1944) ; Shapiro v.
Kimbrough, 20 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944).
332. R. E. E. De Montluzin Co. v. New Orleans & N.E. R.R., 166 La. 822,
828, 118 So. 33, 35 (1928).
333. See W. M. Bailey & Sons v. Western Geophysical Co., 66 So. 2d 424 (La.
App, 2d Cir. 1953). See also Allen Nugent & Co. v. Buisson, 35 La. Ann. 108
(1883) ; Lalance Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Wolff & Levi, 28 La. Ann. 942 (1876);
Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12, La. Ann. 699 (1857). Cf. Wilmot & Co. v. Steamer
Ouachita Belle, 32 La. Ann. 607 (1880). :.! ; . ;
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sales of immovables the resolutory action has been held to exist
against the original purchaser and also third persons acquiring
real rights or title to the property.3 4 The Civil Code does not
specifically require recordation of sales of immovables as a pre-
requisite for the exercise of the right of dissolution against third
persons and the Louisiana Supreme Court has held repeatedly
that "the question of registry has nothing to do with the case."'' 5
Thus, whether the original sale is or is not recorded, the unpaid
vendor may obtain resolution and reclaim the immovable from
a subsequent purchaser. The dissolution operates retroactively
and all transfers or encumbrances made by the original pur-
chaser are cancelled. 8
Application of different rules to movables and immovables
may be justified by several considerations. In general, immo-
vable property has been protected by the law much more effec-
tively than movable property; and, whereas security of titles to
immovables is achieved by the system of public records, security
of transaction and acquisition of movables is enhanced by the
bona fide purchase doctrine. Thus, in the interest of security of
transactions, the resolutory condition in case of nonpayment of
the purchase price becomes inoperative against third possessors
of movables. Availability of the right of dissolution against sub-
sequent purchasers of an immovable where the original sale is
not recorded is compatible with, and may be regarded as an ap-
plication of, the public records doctrine. In such a case the vend-
or is the owner of record and third persons acquiring rights from
the purchaser have a title which is "utterly null and void, except
between the parties thereto" (Article 2266). Difficulties arise
where the original sale is recorded because in that case the sub-
334. See Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 105 La. 405, 29 So. 906 (1901); Lebourgeois
v. Lebourgeois, 23 La. Ann. 757 (1871) (judgment creditors of the vendee) ; Adler
v. Adler, 126 La. 472, 52 So. 688 (1910) ; Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12.La. Ann.
699 (1857) (mortgage creditors) ; Torregano v. Segura's Syndic., 2 Mart. (N.S.)
158 (La. 1824) (chirographic creditors) ; McKenzie v. Bacon, 41 La. Ann. 6, 5
So. 640 (1899) (subsequent purchasers); Stevenson v. Brown, 32 La. Ann. 461
(1880) (purchaser at judicial sale).
335. Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 205 La. 242, 17 So. 2d 264, 266
(1944) ; McKenzie v. Bacon, 41 La. Ann. 6, 5 So. 640 (1889) ; Stevenson v.
Brown, 32 La. Ann. 461 (1880). Of. Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 105 La. 405, 409, 29
So. 906, 907 (1901) : "The failure to register this sale in the conveyance or mort-
gage records does not militate against the right of the vendor to enforce the reso-
lutory condition."
336. See Adler v. Adler, 126 La. 472, 475, 52 So. 668 (1910) : 'That the judi-
cial dissolution of a sale of real estate for non-payment of the [purchase] price
frees the property from all mortgages and' charges created by the purchaser, or
resulting from' his possession as owner, and the operation of law, is too well set-
tied for dispute."
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sequent purchaser acquires title from the owner of record, the
purchaser who failed to fulfill his obligations. Even in such a
case, however, it has been held that the subsequent purchaser
acquires a defeasible title because the public records put him on
notice as to the possible nonpayment of the price.3 7 The action
for dissolution is inadmissible only where the third person relies
on affirmative statements in the public records that the purchase
price has been paid.38
The rule that in the absence of recordation the vendor's priv-
ilege on an immovable cannot be enforced against third persons,
whereas dissolution can be enforced, may seem to involve a ques-
tionable distinction. In both instances the vendor is unpaid; but,
while he cannot claim the purchase price, he can reclaim the
property itself. Actually, there is no contradiction since, as it
has been demonstrated, this result is fully compatible with the
nature of the rights exercised and the public records doctrine.
On the contrary, it is the availability of dissolution in spite of
recordation of the sale that may conflict with the public records
doctrine. Insofar as third persons are concerned, reliance on the
public records ought to exclude dissolution of a recorded sale in
the absence of affirmative indication in the records that the
right has been reserved and that the price has not been paid. In
appropriate cases Louisiana courts could reach this result on the
basis of remedial legislation. 3 9
. In the light of the foregoing, one might be tempted to classify
the vendor's right of dissolution as a personal right when the
sale is of movable property and as a real right when object of the
sale is an immovable. Accurate analysis, however, should regard
the right of dissolution of a sale, whether relating to movable
or immovable property, as a right to transform a legal relation-
337. See Stevenson v. Brown, 32 La. Ann.. 461, 464 (1880) : "One purchasing
property must look to his titles. In the present case the title informed Wade that
his vendor Brown had agreed that in the event of failure to pay the notes given
for the price, the property was to revert to Stevenson." Cf. Ragsdale v. Ragsdale,
105 La. 405, 409, 29 So. 906, 908 (1901) : "The underlying principle is that until
the vendee pays the purchase price he holds by a defeasible title only, and all who
deal .with him are equally affected."
338. See Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 166
La. 201, 116 So. 851 (1928) and authorities cited.
339. See La. Acts 1950, No. 7; LA. R.S. 9:2721-24 (1950). Cf. Blevins v.
Manufacturers Record Publishing Co., 235 La. 708, 771, 105 So. 2d 392, 414
(1958) : "A third party purchaser may rely upon the conveyance records and is
not bound -or barred by unrecorded claims against the property purchased"; Jack-
son v. Golson, 91 So. 2d 394 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
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ship34 ° which is neither personal nor real. Indeed, :distinction
,should be made between the right of dissolution availablp .;tO a
vendor and rights that arise after dissolution of a sale. .Where
the right of dissolution is validly exercised, the sale is dissolved
ex tunc and the vendor is deemed never to have parted with his
title in the property. Thus, after dissolution, the vendor exer-
cises his ownership rights and is accordingly entitled to follow
the thing in the hands of third persons as owner.341 Loss of pos9-
session by the purchaser of movables, and acquisition of immov-
ables by reliance on affirmative evidence in public records in the
case of immovables, are merely circumstances determining, avail-
ability of the right of dissolution and have nothing to do with
the classification of this right as personal or real.
8. Lessor's Rights: Special Privilege and Right of Pledge.-
According to Article 2705 of the Civil Code, "the lessor has, for
the payment of his rent, and other obligations of the lease, ia
right of pledge on the movable effects of the lessee, which are
found on the property leased." This right of pledge extends to
"the effects . . . of the undertenant, so far as the latter is, in-
debted to the principal lessee, at the time when the proprietor
chooses to exercise his right" (Article 2706) and "also to those
belonging to third persons, when their goods are contained in
the house or store, by their own consent, express or implied"
(Article 2707). In the last case, however, "movables are not sub-
ject to this right, when they are only transiently or accidentally
in the house, store, or shop, such as the baggage of a traveller
in an inn, merchandise sent to a workman to be made up or re-
paired, and effects lodged in the store of an auctioneer to be
sold" (Article 2708).
In addition to this right of pledge, the lessor of immovable
property has a special privilege342 securing payment of the, rent
on "the crops of the year, and on the furniture, which is found in
the house let, or in the farm, and on everything which serves to
the working of the farm (Article 3217, Section 3). Right of
pledge and special privilege are co-extensive and, as a result of
340. Cf. 1 ENNECCEUs-N1PPEDEY, ALLGEMEINER TtM DES BtRGEL CHEN
REOHTS 280 (1952).
341. "The vendor's action is one in revendication of the thing." Stevenson v.
Brown, 32 La. Ann. 461, 464 (1880). Cf. Castle v. Floyd, 38 La. Ann. 583 (1886).
342. Cf. O'Kelly v. Ferguson, 49 La. Ann. 1230, 1245, 22 So. 783, 789 (1897) :
"We think the lessor has a double right-a right of pledge, with its right'of de-
tention, and included and resulting right of preference, and a right of privilege
proper."
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'their icmbination, "the right which the lessor has over the prod-
:ucts' of the estate, and on the movables which are found on the
place leased, for his rent, is of a higher nature than mere priv-
ilege,. The latter is only enforced on the price arising from the
sale of movables to which it applies. It does not enable the cred-
itor to take or keep the effects themselves specially. The lessor,
on the contrary, may take the effects themselves and retain
them until he is paid" (Article 3218).
The lessor's privilege and right of pledge are incidental to
:and arise out of the contract of lease by operation of law.3 43
Ordinarily, it is essential to the existence of a pledge that the
creditor be put into possession of the thing pledged. 34 4 For the
purpose of the lessor's pledge, however, the lessee's possession
is that of the lessor.3 45 The lessor's privilege for rent on the par-
ticular movables to which it attaches is, as a general rule, su-
perior to that of any other debt.3 46 The lessor may secure pay-
:ment of the rent by a writ of sequestration. 347 Article 2709 of
the Civil Code provides that "the lessor may seize the objects
subject to his privilege before the lessee removes them from the
leased premises, or within fifteen days after they have been re-
moved by the lessee without the consent of the lessor, if they con-
tinue to be the property of the lessee, and can be identified."3 48
According to settled jurisprudence, the lessor's rights of pledge
and privilege on movables belonging to third persons are lost as
soon, as these things are removed from the premises whether
with or without the consent of the lessor.349 Pledge and privilege
on movables of the lessee are lost upon removal of these things
from the premises with the consent of the lessor.3 50 In case of
,unauthorized removal, pledge and privilege are extinguished as
soon as things belonging to the lessee lose their identity or are
343. See LA. CIVIL COnE arts. 2705-09, 3217(3), 3218 (1870); DAGGETT,
LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 172 (1942).
344. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3152 (1870).
345. See Villere v. Succession of Shaw, 108 La. 71, 32 So. 196 (1902) ; Arick
v. Walsh & Boisseau, 23 La. Ann. 605 (1871) . 71, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3433(1870).
346. See DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 191 (1942).
347. See LA. CODE OF CrIL PROCEDURE arts. 3571, 3572, 3575 (1960).
* 348. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2709. (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 30,
349. See Kupperman v. Moore, 185 La. 1000, 171 So. 104 (1936) ; Merrick,
,Race & Foster v. La Hache, 27 La. Ann. 87 (1875) ; Hughes v. Caruthers, 26 La.
Ann. 530 (1874) ; Lesseps v. Ritcher, 18 La. Ann. 653 (1866). But of. Ritchie: v.
White, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 239 (La. 1822) (privilege on movables of third persons
continues for fifteen days after removal).
350. See Boyston v. Jones, 153 So. 53 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
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acquired by a third person in good faith351 and after the lapse of
.fifteen days, even if the things still belong to the lessee and can
be identified. 52
The juridical nature of the lessor's combined rights of pledge
and privilege is controversial. In France, the lessor may assert
his pledge and privilege within certain time limits even on mov-
ables removed from the premises and alienated.35 The prevail-
ing view, therefore, regards the rights of the lessor as amount-
ing to a veritable (though qualified) pledge, namely a privileged
real right 54 In Louisiana, it has been said that "a pledge is a
privilege with the right of retention of the property pledged"
and "this is precisely the lessor's right. ' 355 This statement is in-
accurate insofar as it reduces the real right of pledge to a mere
privilege, contrary to the historical sources and the doctrine
underlying the Civil Code. But it is fully justified insofar as it
analyzes the nature of the lessor's rights in Louisiana. Unlike
the situation in France, the lessor in Louisiana cannot assert his
rights against property in the hands of third persons who have
acquired title. The lessor in this state does not have the right to
follow the movables but merely a right of retention and a right
of preference, a privilege on movables while they are on the
premises and for fifteen days after their removal if they still
351. In case of fraudulent or collusive transfer of the lessee's movables to third
persons, the lessor has an action ex delicto against the perpetrators of the fraud
or collusion. See Hyman v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 144 La. 1074, 81 So.
718 (1919) id., 139 La. 411, 71 So. 598 (1916) ; Worrell v. Vickers, 30 La. Ann.
202 (1878); Kidd v. Terrel, 145 So. 23 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932). It has been
stated that the lessor's pledge is "property" and that prescription of the lessor's
action against the participants in the fraud of the lessee does not run while the
lessor is deliberately kept in ignorance. See Hyman v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co.,
139 La. 411, 71 So. 598 (1916).
352. See Carroll v. Bancker, 43 La. Ann. 1078, 10 So. 187 (1891) ; Conrad
v. Patzelt, 29 La. Ann. 465 (1877) ; Silliman v. Short, Martin & Hall, 26 La.
Ann. 512 (1874) ; Farnet, Noel & Guirard v. Creditors, 8 La. Ann. 372 (1853) ;
Hanna v. Creditors, 12 Mart.(O.S.) 32 (La. 1822) ; General Motors Arceptance
Corp. v. Hand, 133 So. 466 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
353. Article 2102 of the French Civil Code provides that the lessor preserves
his privilege and may seize movables removed from the premises without his con-
sent, provided that he "revendicates" movables contained in a farm within forty
days and movables contained in a house within fifteen days. Ordinarily, the delay
commences to run from the day of the removal; but in case of fraudulent conceal-
ment of the removal the delay runs from the day the lessor acquires knowledge of
the fact. Article 2279 of the French Civil Code does not apply during this delay;
thus, ordinarily, the lessor can claim things alienated by the lessee and possessed
,by third persons in good faith. A limited protection is accorded to purchasers in
good faith under Article 2280 of the French Civil Code, corresponding to Article
3507 of the Louisiana Code. See 12 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP, PRATIQUE DE
OROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 280 (1953).
354. See 12 PLANIOL ET RiPERT, TRAiTg PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRArffAIS
273 (1953).
355. Villere v. Succession of Shaw, 108 La. 71, 73, 32 So. 196 (1902).
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belong to the lessee and can be identified. True, the Code de-
clares that the lessor has a "pledge" rather than a "mere priv-
ilege." 356 But a veritable pledge is a real right conferring on the
pledgee both a right of retention and a right to follow the prop-
erty,3 57 while the lessor's pledge confers only a right of reten-
tion. Thus, in functional terms, the cumulation of the lessor's
right of pledge and privilege in Louisiana produces a right of
preference fortified by a right of retention and resembling
"pledge" because of this last characteristic.358 The lessor's com-
bined right, therefore, is neither a personal nor a real right but
the quality359 of a right deriving from lease, a contract creating
personal rights.
9. Promise To Sell Immovables. - On several occasions, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has declared that "a promise of sale,
duly accepted and recorded, confers a real right on the pur-
chaser."' ' 0 Relying on these declarations, an able student reached
356. Of. LA. CIVIL ConE arts. 2705, 3218 (1870). Article 3220 of the Civil
Code distinguishes clearly between the real right of pledge and the right of pref-
erence (privilege) attached thereto: "The creditor acquires the right of possession
and retaining the movable which he has received in pledge, as security for his debt,
and may cause it to be sold for the payment of the same. Hence proceeds the
privilege which he enjoys on the thing."
357. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3158 (1870). Article 3162 of the Civil Code
declares that "in no case does this privilege subsist on the pledge, except when
the thing pledged . . . has been actually put and remained in the possession of the
creditor, or of a third person agreed on by the parties." This does not mean that
the pledgee is deprived of the right to follow the thing pledged but that his right of
preference cannot be exercised if the thing is in the possession of third persons.
This becomes clear in the light of Article 3220 of the Civil Code which declares
that the pledgee "acquires the right of possession." Cf. Succession of Picard, 238
La. 455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959). See also Article 2701 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure which provides for a statutory pactum de non alienando attached
to a "mortgage or privilege evidenced by authentic act." Accordingly, if the pledgee
loses possession, he can reclaim the thing in the hands of third parties. His right
to follow the thing, however, may be defeated in certain cases as a result of the
bona fide purchaser doctrine. But cf. Slovenko, Of Pledge, 33 TUL. L. REV. 59, 75
(1958) asserting that pledge does not confer the right to follow. Elsewhere, how-
ever, the author indicates that pledge is a "real right" (id. at 60, 103), "the most
real of the real securities" (id. at 59, n. 2) and that "the pledge creditor has legal
possession and hence has the benefit of the usual real actions for retaining and
recovering possession" (id. at 125). It would seem that a real right, by definition,
ought to include the right to follow and that protection of the pledgee's possession
is the essence of this last right. But, while the possession of the pledgee is pro-
tected under Louisiana law, it is doubtful whether the real actions of the Code
of Civil Procedure are applicable in this context. Cf. text at note 69 supra.
358. Cf. Pickens v. Webster, 31 La. Ann. 870 (1879) ("quasi-pledge") ; Case
v. Kloppenburg, 27 La. Ann. 482 (1875).
359. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAIT DE DROIT CIVIL, V SUPPLEMENT by
Bonnecase 478 (1930); GINOSSAR, DROIT RAEL, PROPRIfTle ET CRANCE 131
(1960).
360. Kingberger v. Drouet, 149 La. 986, 999, 90 So. 367, 372 (1922). See also
Lehman v. Rice, 118 La. 975, 43 So. 639 (1907) ; Barfield v. Saunders, 116 La.
136, 40 So. 593 (1906). Cf. 1 TROPLONG, DE LA VENTE 344 (1856).
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the conclusion that "an option to buy" an immovable is a real
right in Louisiana.3 1' This is only a half-truth.
A promise to sell (or the corresponding option to buy) can-
not be regarded as a real right by any stretch of analysis. This
transaction, if recorded, merely confers a right on the prospec-
tive purchaser to perfect the sale as of the time of recordation
in case interests of third parties are involved.162 A perfected
sale is a transaction "translative" of title under the Civil Code
and the purchaser becomes "owner" of the immovable sold with-
out the need of delivery of possession . 3 As between the parties,
ownership is deemed transferred from the time of the sale but
this ownership can be asserted against third parties only from
the time of delivery of possession and recordation.6 4 Thus, the
"specific performance" which the purchaser claims, and is en-
titled to, under Article 2462 of the Louisiana Civil Code is noth-
ing else but a revendication and an exercise of his right of own-
ership. 865 The so-called "real right" of the purchaser, therefore,
is not a real right distinct from ownership.
361. See Comment, Real Rights in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REV. 462, 466 (1961).
362. See Watson v. Bethany, 209 La. 989, 26 So. 2d 12 (1946) ; Kingberger v.
Drouet, 149 La. 886, 90 So. 367 (1922) ; Lehman v. Rice, 118 La. 975, 43 So.
639 (1907) ; Barfield v. Saunders, 116 La. 136, 40 So. 593 (1906).
363. See LA. CviL CODE art. 2456 (1870).
364. See LA. CivL CODE art. 2442 (1870).
3&. See Watson v. Bethany, 209 La. 989, 26 So. 2d 12 (1946).
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